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GREY AREAS IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR:
LEGALITY VERSUS CORRUPTIBILITY

Ararat L. Osipian
I.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption in higher education has long been neglected as
an area of research in the United States. Perhaps the relative
scarcity of prosecuted cases has made such corruption appear
to be a seemingly small problem in the nation's higher
education system, and therefore not significant enough from a
researcher's standpoint to warrant much attention. Because
most cases are settled out of court, there is little case law on
corruption in higher education. Thus, little to no precedent has
been set, which is particularly important for a common law
system, such as the U.S. legal system. Another explanation for
the lack of attention might be that scholars attended higher
education institutions (HEis), and the majority of those
scholars are now employed by colleges and universities. The
sense of belonging and close affiliation related to their position
in academia may prevent scholars from conducting research on
academic corruption. Additionally, the apparent absence of
studies about corruption in higher education is an image
constructed in both the scholarly community and among the
general public because scholars do not use words denoting
corruption. Scholars, as well as members of the media, are
overly cautious about the language of investigations and usage
of such explicit legal terms as "corruption," "bribery," and
"fraud," instead choosing to replace them with such terms and
euphemisms such as "misconduct" and "breach of integrity."
Finally, the definition of "education corruption" is itself still
vague and undeveloped. This vagueness creates uncertainty for
prospective research, specifically deciding which approaches
and methodologies to employ. The limits of the object of the
research (i.e., the locus) also remain unclear for those who wish
to study corruption in higher education.
141
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In essence, this paper is a survey and offers general
commentary on corruption in higher education. It defines
corruption generally, helps to define corruption in higher
education in the legal context, and discusses types of
corruption in higher education by differentiating between three
types of corruption: abuse of academic integrity, 1 corruption in
higher education per se,2 corruption in the higher education
sector-'. At the same time, this study looks into so-called grey
areas, where acts that are commonly understood as corrupt are
not immediately or explicitly qualified as illegal, and
challenges the terms of "legality" and "corruptibility" in order
to build a better understanding of whether all illegal acts that
take place in higher education constitute acts of corruption.
Additionally, this paper discusses perspectives on corruption,
including legal, economic, social, and moral or ethical
responsibility, analyzes records of selected legal cases devoted
to corruption in higher education, and discusses trends and
practices in the financial industry of educational loans.

11.
A.

CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Defining Higher Education Corruption

The research on corruption in higher education is in its
infancy. Few attempts have been made so far to theorize
corruption in the education sector and to investigate it
empirically. Corruption in academia is a global problem. 4
I. Academic integrity implies honesty in academic lift•, including scholarly
activities.
2. Higlwr leducation per sl: is built around the processes of teaching and !learning
and research.
:l. Corruption in thle higher education Sl'ctor is mon: expansiVl' than abusl' of
academic integrity or corruption in higher education per Sle. Institutions of highl·r
learning operate numerous other units and facilities including large nwdical centers.
industry orilmted reslearch institutes, academic publishing, athldics, and hookst.on•s.
From hospitals and construction and devldopment departnwnts to maintenance and
supplies, as long as these units are formally includt•d in the universities and opl:ratl'
under thl,ir umbrella. they an: part of thl' highl•r education sector. Therdorl'.
corruption in the higher leducation sector includes corruption in all of tlw an:as that tlw
institution of higlwr leducation controls. The higher education sector is also fn:quently
refl,rn'd to as the highler education industry.
1. For a compn,hl,nsivl' review of a varit't.y of form.s of Pducation corruption
found in different national educational systlems. see ,)AC()LH:s HALLi\K & M Ultii·:L
!'OlSSON, COHIWI'T SCHOOLS, COHIUJI"I' UNIVICitSITIES: WHAT CAN BE DmH:'! (20(J7).
available
at
http://unpan 1.un.orglintradoc/groups/public/documents/UN ESCO/
UNI'AN02510:l.pdf.

1]

LEGALITY VERSUS CORRUPTIBILITY

143

Nevertheless, a rigorous scholarly investigation into the matter
of academic corruption is lacking. 5 Education corruption is
detrimental for economic development and growth. The links
between economic growth and corruption in higher education
in Russia and in Ukraine are established and conceptualized, 6
and the economic impact of higher education corruption on
personal income m Central Asia has been investigated
quantitatively. 7 In addition, others have drawn some
inferences on corruption in universities in the Russian
Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia,
based on interviews. 8 However, no similar work has been done
in the United States, and existing research relies heavily on
people's perceptions about corruption rather than facts and
hard evidence. The impact of human capital on economic
growth can be diminished if educational programs are weak
and academic degrees and credentials are bogus.
Higher education corruption remains a definitional problem
as well. The definition of education corruption includes abuse
of authority for material gainY Education is an important
public good, and thus "its professional standards include more
than just material goods; hence the definition of education
5. Osipian presents the first comprehensive study of forms of corruption in the
US, the UK, and Russia, and finds that economic and structural factors are
explanatory in researching the different forms and types of corruption across the
nations. Ararat Osipian, Corruption in Higher Education: Does it Differ Across the
Nations and Why(, :3 RESEAHCH TN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION 317,
:345<l65 (2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/1 0.2:l01/rcie.2008.3.4.:l15.
6. See AHARAT OSIPTAN, THE IMPACT OF HUMAN CAPITAL ON ECONOMIC GHOWTH:
A CASE STUDY IN POST-SOVIET UKHAINE, 1989-2009 (2009);
ARARAT 0SIPIAN,
Education Corruption, Reform, and Growth: Case of Post-Soviet Russia, 3 JOURNAL OF
EUHASIAN STUDIES 1 (2011), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S 1879:166511000248. Corruption is present in doctoral education as well,
with dissertations offered for sale by ghostwriters. See Ararat Osipian, Le Bourgeois
Gentilhomme: Political Corruption of Russian Doctorates, 18 DEMOKHATIZATSIYA: THE
JOUI{NAL OF POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION 260 (2010); Ararat Osipian, Korruptsiya
v poslediplomnom obrazovanii [Corruption in doctoral education], 8 TEHRA
ECONOMICUS 48 (2010); Ararat Osipian, Economics of Corruption in Doctoral
l~'ducation: The Dissertations Market, ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION REVIEW (2011),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.101 6/j.econedurev.2011.08.011.
7. See Stephen Heyneman, Kathryn Anderson, & Nazym Nuraliyeva, The Cost of
Corruption in Higher Education, 52 COMPARATIVI•; EDUCATION REVn;w 1, 1-26 (2008).
8. See Georgy Petrov & Paul Temple, Corruption in Higher Education: Some
Findings from the States of the Former Soviet Union. 16 HIGHER EDUCATION
MANAGEMENT ANn POLICY 99 (2001); Stephen Heyneman, Three Universities in

Georuia, Kazahhstan and Kyruyzstan: The Struuule Against Corruption and for Social
Cohesion, 37 PHOSPECTS: QUARTERLY REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE EDUCATION 305 (2007).
9. FRANK ANECHIAJUCO & JAMES JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY:
HOW COIWUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE 5 (1995).
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corruption includes the abuse of authority for personal as well
as material gain." 10 The relativity of the term corruption has
been applied to academia:
The notion of a corrupt official or other role occupant exists
only relative to some notion of what an uncorrupted occupant
of that morally legitimate role consists of. The notion of an
academic has at its core the moral ideal, or at least, the
morally legitimate role, of an independent truth-seeker who
works in accordance with accepted principles of reason and
evidence, who publishes in his or her own name only work
that he or she has actually done, and so on. So an academic
motivated by a desire for academic status who intentionally
falsifies his or her experimental results or plagiarizes the
work of others is corrupt relative to the ideal or morally
legitimate role of an uncorrupted academic. On the other
hand, a person occupying an academic position who paid no
heed whatsoever to the truth or to principles of reasoning and
evidence and who made no pretense of so doing would at some
point cease to be an academic of any sort, corrupt or
otherwise. 11

The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP)
defines corruption in education as a "misuse of public office for
private gain that influences access, quality, and equity in
education." 12 Some present a broad social approach to define
corruption, 13 while others adhere to the legal approach to
corruption and apply a narrow definition that regards
corruption as such only if it implies illegality. 14 National laws
differ, and legality and illegality are not universal. Accordingly,
there might be not one universal definition of corruption in
higher education that would apply equally well to different
national systems in different historical periods. Granting
access to publicly funded higher education on any premise
10. Stephen Heyneman, /~ducat ion and Corruption, 21 IN'I'I-:IlNATIOI\:\L .)OUI(I\,\L
OF EllLJ('.A'I'IO:-.Ii\L DEVELOPMENT ();)7, 6:38 (20(H).
11. Seumas Milll'r, Pc•ter Roburts & Edward Spence, COIWUPTIOI\ ANIJ i\1\TICOHIWl'TIO:-.J; AI\ i\I'I'L'":Ll PHILOSOPHICAL APPIWACH 5 (2005).
12. Moriel Poisson, Corruption and l~dumtion. UNESCO I NTI•:IlNATIO:-.Ii\L
1:-.JSTITUTE
FOil
EDUCATIONAL
l'Li\:-.1:-.JI:'·H:
(2007).
available
at
http://www. iil'p. unesco.org/fileadmin/user upload/ I nfo_Services l'ublications/pdf/20 I 0/

EdPol_ll. pdf.
1 il. Taleh Sayed & David Bruce. !'alice Corruption: 'J(Jwards a Worliinf[
JJefinition, 7 AI•'I\ICAN SECLIIUTY REVI~:w 1, 1 (1998): Duncan Waite & David Alletl.
Corruption and Abuse of !'ower in l~ducational Administ.ration, :35TH 1•: UHB.'\N I{EVI EW

281, 281 (200:3).

1·1.

l'drov, Corrupfl:on in Higher l~ducation, at 100.
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other than academic merit is equated to corruption, as is access
to higher education in exchange for a bribe. In the
decentralized market-based systems of higher education,
gammg access to educational services in exchange for
payments is a norm. Depending on the system and legal
frameworks laid in the society, certain forms of funding, modes
of operation, patterns of behavior, and standards of conduct in
higher education may be considered corrupt or non-corrupt.
Corruption in higher education is time and place specific, and
may be found in public and private colleges.
The solutions that states offer in order to curb corruption
are superficial and partial at best, leaving plenty of space for
corrupt educators to act. Education vouchers, standardized
tests, student loans, and partial privatization of higher
education are among the reforms aimed at tackling corruption
in the higher education sector. 15 The success of the reforms has
yet to be seen. Corruption in higher education becomes
institutionalized and develops its own internal hierarchies,
resistant to change, 16 and institutional rigidity helps
corruption hierarchies in higher education in developing and
transition societies. 17 As used in economics, the definition of
corruption underlines the role of the state and assumes
corruptibility of a government official. However, corruption in
higher education presents the need for a more inclusive
definition.
The challenge to the understanding of corruption as applied
to higher education arises when confronted with cases of

15. See Ararat Osipian, Replacing University Entry Examinations with
Standardized Tests in Russia: Will It Reduce Corruption~. UCEA CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS FOR CONVENTION 2007 (D. Thompson and F. Crampton editors 2007),
auailable
at
http://www.ucea.org/storage/convention/convention2007/proceedings/
Osipian2_UCEA2007.pdf; Ararat Osipian, Higher l~ducation Corruption in Ukraine:
Opinions and /<;stimates, 49 INTERNATIONAL HIGHEI{ EDUCATION 21, 21-22 (2007);
Ararat Osipian, Vouchers, Tests, Loans, Privatization: Will They Help Tackle
Corruption in Russian Higher l~ducation?, :39 PROSPECTS: QUARTERLY I{EVIEW OF
COMI'AnATIVE EDUCATION 47, 47-67 (2009); Ararat Osipian, Corruption and Reform in
Hi{{her Education in Uhraine, :38 CANADIAN AND INTimNATIONAL EDUCATION .JOUI<NAL
101, 101-122 (2009).
16. Ararat Osipian, Corruption Hierarchies in Higher 8ducation in the Former
Soviet Bloc, 29 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT :321, :321-:3:30
(2009)
17. Ararat Osipian, Corruption Hierarchies in J<;ducation in Developing and
Transition Societies, UCEA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS FOR CONVENTION (D.
Thompson and F. Crampton editors 2007), available at http://www.ucca.org/
storage/con vcn tion/convcn tion2007 /proccedings/Osi pian 1_ U C EA2007. pdf.
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bribery, which can take place in private HEis as well as public
HEls. 1x The fact that students pay bribes in exchange for good
grades independently of the type of HEI urges for more
inclusiveness in the definition of corruption. This paper applies
the definition of "corruption in higher education as a system of
informal relations established to regulate unsanctioned access
to material and nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office
of public or corporate trust." 19
Educators often have incentives to become involved in
corrupt activities not due to their natural corruptness or low
ethical standards, but due to low salaries. University
professors commit corrupt acts in exchange for illicit benefits in
order to supplement their income. Indeed, the "feed from the
service" way of living in academia can be found throughout the
education sector. 20 The opportunistic behavior of professors
leads them into conflict of interest and collusion with
businesses and political groups. 21 Political graft and education
corruption often go hand in hand. This form of collusion
perpetuates illicit activities in academia and anticipates
benefits for politicians extracted not in monetary form, but in
form of academic distinctions, loyalty, compliance, and control.
Universities award doctoral degrees to politicians as a sign of
respect, often in exchange for patronage, lobbying, and
financial support. 22 In fact, the ruling regimes may be
interested in corrupt universities for it makes it easier to coerce
educators into compliance with the state orders if these
Hl. A1wcdotal l'videncp from thu Former Sovid Bloc indicates that hriiH'ry· in
higlwr t;ducation may be as common in private collcgt•s as in stat(• col!t•ges and
universities. See Ararat Osipian, looyalty as /lent: Corruption and I'oliticization of
llussian Uniuersitics, :l2 lNTEllNi\TIONi\L JOlJilNi\1. <H' SOCIOI.O<:Y i\NIJ SOCIAl. I'OI.ICY
(20 12) (forthcoming).

19. Ararat Osipian. Corruption in Higher l~ducation: Conceptual Appmaches and
Techniques, 2 l{i•:SEi\llCH IN COMI'i\IL\'I'IVE AND lNTJo:llNXI'ION,\1.
EDUCATION :lill, :315 (2007).
20. Ararnt Osipian, "Feed from the Seruice':- Corruption and Coercion in the
State-Uniuasity !?elations in Central l~urusia, 1 !{fo:SI•:AilCH IN Co~II'Ail.\TIVE ,\:-.JJJ
lNTI.;IlNi\TIONAL EllUCi\TI0:-..1 182 (2009).
21. The impact of husim>sses on the academia is addrt>ssl'd in ,J fo:NNI Flm
WASHBUilN. TIH: COili'Oili\TE COIUWI''J'ION OF AMJo:IW'i\:-.1 HH:111m EJJLH'.\TI0:-..1 (2005).
Tlw issue of existing links between the state and univnsities in the fornwr Sovil>l.
republics is addressed in Ararat Osipian, l'olitical Graft and l~ducation Corruption in
Ulm1ine: Compliance, Collusion, and Control, 1 () DI,:MoKIL\Tii:A'I'SIYA: TH 1·: ,JOlJil:-.1.\L OF
!'OST-Sovn:T DEMOCRATIZATION :J2:l (2008).
22. See Ararat Osipian, Le Bourgeois Oentilhomme: l'olitical Corruption of
Hussiun /Joctorates. 18 DEMOKili\Tii:ATSIYi\: 'I'H E ,JOLJilC'JAL OF !'o:-;T-SOVI ET
lh:MOCIL\Tii:i\TION 260 (2010).

Measurement
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educators are involved in corruption. 23
In Russia, where the judiciary branch is relatively weak,
the media pays most attention to bribes paid in exchange for
admissions to publicly funded places in HEis and bribery in the
academic process, because these are the most obvious and
explicit forms of corruption. Bribes are presumed to have a
monetary form, which is traditionally least acceptable and not
well tolerated by the society. Conversely, nepotism and
cronyism are often overlooked, while these forms of corruption
might have more presence in higher education and more
impact on the admissions policy than bribes. Forms of
corruption in higher education in the United States emphasize
state-university relations. Fraud is often the product of grey
areas in legislation. At the same time, issues of fraud are
relatively easy to move to court, because the state interests are
at stake. Therefore, many issues are traditionally decided
through the judiciary branch of the government.

B.

Corruption as a Grey Area

A grey area is a term used to describe terms that are
unclearly defined, or a border that is hard or even impossible to
define, or where a dividing line tends to shift. A grey area
signifies a problem of sorting reality into clearly cut categories.
In legal terms, a grey area is an area where no clear legislation
or precedent exists, where it is not clear whether the existing
rules are applicable to specific cases and to what extent. A grey
area of legislation, as applied to particular industries, sectors,
market segments, or areas of social life, signifies an ethical
dilemma where the border between corrupt and non-corrupt
activities is vague.
The term "grey area" has been used in addressing the
economics of corruption. 24 Although economics have advanced
significantly in modeling corruption, it experiences difficulties
in testing the models due to the lack of large and reliable

2:3. The issue of university autonomy versus state control is theorized in Ararat
Osipian, Corruption and Coercion: University Autonomy versus State Control, 40
EUJUJPEAN EDUCATION: ISSUES AND STUDIES 27 (200R); Ararat Osipian, Cormpt£on in
the Politicized University: Lessons for Ukraine's 2010 Presidential l~lections, 2::3
INNOVATION: THE EUIWI'EAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 101 (2010).
24. See Andrei Shleifer & l{ohert Vishny, Corruption, 108 QUART~~RLY JOUI{NAL
OF ECONOMICS 599 (199:1).
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datasets. 25 Whatever problem economists might have m
explaining corruption is indicated by the definition of
corruption as an "allocative mechanism" for scarce resources. 26
The state monopolizes certain allocative functions, be it
permissions and licenses, or access to public services. State
officials' profiteering is based on abuse of their discretionary
powers and monopolistic positions. Some scholars propose a
"new ... explicitly micro-founded definition of corruption":
[Corruption] is viewed as a collusive agreement between a
part of the agents of the economy who, as a consequence. are
able to swap (over time; we present a repeated game) in terms
of positions of power (i.e. are able to capture, together, the
allocation process of the economy). This is the idea underlying
high-level corruption or "influence", and is broader than the
notion of bribery, which corresponds to a particular sharing
pattern of the joint payoff from the referred relationship. 27
The challenge to the domain of bribery in the issues of
corruption, however, does not eliminate grey areas that exist in
both legislation and scholarly work. Grey areas in legal
scholarship and in economics reflect on legislation and the
national economy, respectively, and overlap. Tax evasion and
fraud as key characteristics of shadow or unofficial economy
are good examples of such an overlap. At least two scholars,
Georgy Petrov and Paul Temple, have critiqued the grey area
notion:
[W]e find unconvincing the proposition that there exists a
continuum from "honest" to "corrupt" behaviour. Such a
continuum implies a "grey area". The example given at a
recent conference on corruption in education of such a "grey
area" was the practice of some US universities of giving the
children of alumni preference in admission procedures
(Hallak and Poisson, 2002). This example simply adds to our
doubts about the "continuum" notion: one may judge this to be
an undesirable way of managing university admissions, but a
stated institutional policy, presumably adopted with the

25. See, for instance, SUSAN ROSI·>ACKEIUvL\;\1, COIWLJI''I'I0;\1: A STUDY l;\1
1\JLITICi\L ECONOMY (197H): .Jean Tirole, Collusion and the Theory of Organizations. in
AllVi\NCI<:S IN I':Co;\IOMIC THEOI\Y (1992); l'ranab Bardhan. Corruption and
IJcuelopment: A Hcuiew of Issues. :l5 .)OLJHNAL OF ECONOMIC LITEI\i\'I'LIIil': 1 :l20 (1997).

26. Hosc-Aclierman, at 2.
27. Danic>l Kaufmann & Pedro Vicente, Legal
NETWORK
:l
(2005),
RI•:SI·:AilCH
cwailahle at
papers.cfm?ahst.ract id=H29H•11.

Corruption, 1 SOCL\L SCII•:NCE

h ttp://papcrs.ssrn .com/so I :ll
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intention of in some sense benefiting the institution as a
whole, cannot, we suggest, sensibly be classified as corrupt. 2f\

Clearly, Petrov and Temple are against the notion of grey
area. They consider the notion of "honest" as the opposite to
"corrupt" and accept these two as the only existing conditions. 29
This paper agrees with the notion of legality and illegality as
applied to the problem of corruption, yet considers it necessary
to accept the fact that not all types of corrupt activities or
forms of corruption are embedded in the national legislations.
Furthermore, the legal lens is perfectly applicable to corruption
in education, but not sufficient to understand and reflect on the
complexity of the issue. The broad scope of the problem
explains the vagueness of its borders.

Ill. TYPES OF CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Corruption in higher education is an emerging subfield in
the loosely-defined scholarly field of education policy. United
States-based scholars have produced few works on the issue of
higher education corruption. But while rigorous systematic
scholarly research of this issue is lacking, the media has been
more generous in its coverage of specific cases of higher
education corruption. The news media frequently reports on
"blatantly wrongful conduct" in the world of academia. 30 What
exactly is this blatantly wrongful conduct that may be found in
American colleges and universities?
Higher education corruption should be separated into three
categories: corruption of academic integrity, corruption in
higher education per se, and corruption in the higher education
sector. Academic integrity includes misconduct in academic
activities, such as research fraud, cheating, and plagiarism.
Corruption in higher education is more inclusive than academic
integrity; it involves bribery. Bribery is encompassed in the
realm of corruption in higher education per se (and not in
academic integrity) because bribery is an explicit expression of
financial incentives; it can have impact on judgment of
academics performing certain administrative functions, but it
does not carry the academic load. Finally, corruption in the
28. l'etrov & Temple, Corruption in Higher gducation, at 85.
29. ld.
:30. Vincent .Johnson, Corruption in Education: A Global Legal Challenge, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 1 7 (2008).
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higher education sector includes all forms of corruption related
to higher education-not just as an academic activity, hut as a
functioning industry. Where corruption of academic integrity is
on one end of the spectrum, limited to corruption dealing with
actual academia, corruption in the higher education sector
would he on the opposite end of the spectrum, dealing with
corruption beyond just academia. For instance, professional
misconduct in university hospitals, which does not qualify as
corruption in academic industry, is qualified as corruption in
the higher education sector, simply because a university
hospital constitutes a part of the HEI. The university hospital
example emphasizes the fact that professional misconduct in a
university hospital is corruption in the higher education sector
by virtue of it being a "university hospital." At the same time,
this same case is not an example of corruption in academic
integrity because it docs not have anything to do with actual
"academics."
There is a clear trend in the U.S. that gives more attention
to fraud and plagiarism than bribery. 31 Media attention reflects
growing concern about corruption in academia. More attention
is now paid to fraud and plagiarism, rather than possible
bribery in admissions. These findings help to determine which
aspects of corruption in higher education should he given more
consideration in future research and which might be
prioritized, as well as how the national systems of higher
education can be improved. 32 Specifics of the U.S. higher
education industry explain the uniqueness of the types of
corruption to the U.S. In particular, "The growing market of
private educational loans in the US, which has increased
tenfold over the last decade, rising from $1.57 billion to $17
billion, leads to different types of fraud in state-university
relations. Fraudulent activities, in their turn, necessitate state
and federal investigations." 33 Many different types of fraud
that infiltrate the three areas of corruption in higher education
arc discussed below.

:n. Tlwrl' an' also differences in t.hl' types of corruption bdwl't'n tlw Unitt-d
Statl's. Llw Unit(•d Kingdom. and Llw Russian Fedl'ration. Sonw forms of corruption m·e
n•gion-specific. whill' others nrc univ(,rsal; t.nws of corruption nn• comwcted to thl'
charactl'ristics of thl' national systl'ms.
:12. Ararat Osipian. Corruption in Higher l~ducalion: /Joes it /Jijj(T Across the
Nations and Why(,;; n~<:s. It\ COI\11'. ,\Nil 1:--.JT'L EJJLIC. :H5 (2008).
:l:l. /d. nt. :lfi1.
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Financial Misconduct

One form of higher education corruption is financial
misconduct,
which
includes
HEI's
financial
officers
participating in financial activities that hurt students and
impair the quality of their education. Embezzlement, fraud,
and frivolous classes are forms of corruption in the U.S. higher
education sector. 34 "Other corrupt practices in American higher
education include no-show jobs that deplete university budgets,
over-billing of the government, prohibited payments to
athletes, obstruction of justice, overpayments as a result of nobid contracts, improper gifts, kickbacks related to student
loans, and, occasionally, even bribery of college or university
officials." 35 In one instance, the directors of financial aid at
three major universities "held shares in a student loan
company that each of the universities recommends to student
borrowers, and in at least two cases profited handsomely." 36
Presumably, students were the victims of such illicit
arrangements. A grey area in legal terms is an area where no
clear legislation or precedent exists. 37 It is also not clear
whether the existing rules are applicable to specific cases and
to what Pxtent. Application of laws in certain market segments
does not guarantee that they will have a similar or identical
application in the higher education sector. A law may be
applied successfully to incidences of corruption in the public
sector, but have no court precedent in similar practices in the
higher education sector. As such, application of laws in
unchartered waters of private educational loans and other
areas of possible misconduct in the higher education sector de
facto faces initial difficulties raised by the existing grey areas.

B.

Faculty Wrongdoing

It seems students are being portrayed as victims, not only
in regard to unfair dealings of university administrators with
:H. Johnson , supra note :lO, at :n.
:l5. !d. at 17 ·18.
:16. ,Jonathan D. Glater, Student Loans Led to Benefits by Collq;e Aides, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at Al.
:n. Osipian describes grey areas in the higher education sector finance through
the prism of legality and corruption. See Ararat Osipian, Grey Areas in the Higher
8ducation Sector Finance: llle{fality versus Corruption (Mar. 21, 2009) (unpublished
paper, presented at the Annual Meeting of the American };ducation Finance
Association (AEFA)).
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student loan providers, but also in regard to academic abuse
from university faculty. For instance, one scholar suggests that
modern academic practices in some U.S. colleges and
universities arc deceptive, to a certain extent, and work to
disorient students. He makes a strong statement by suggesting
that professors and college administrators arc cheating
students of their future. He point to professors having
abandoned the lecture hall and their teaching responsibilities,
instead turning over much of their teaching load to unqualified
and busy graduate students, and how academic standards in
both grading and research have declined to even lower levels:
They are the corrupt priests of America's colleges and
universities and, while small in number, their influence is
large and pervasive. They are the great pretenders of
academe. They pretend to teach, they pretend to do original,
important work. They do neither. They are impostors in the
temple. And from these impostors, most of the educational ills
of America flow. Only when we understand these renegade
intellectual priests. and take action against them, can
America's full intellectual integrity and power be restored. 1x

Another scholar also holds a negative view on college
professors' behavior. Pointing to overcrowded classrooms,
teaching duties delegated to graduate assistants, and easy to
pass courses specifically designed for underperforming tuitionpaying students, he notes that professors are most concerned
with the publish or perish race and position themselves as
experts with the help of sophisticated professional language:
"Whatever lofty claims they might make about their ideals ...
academics share the same motives that animate the souls of
every bureaucracy and closed guild ... Every petty bureaucrat
recognizes that power rests, in large part, on the ability to
cloak his or her knowledge behind a veil of inf1ated and
intimidating jargon," which the author also calls "profspeak." 39
While the major perpetrators in student loan schemes appear
to be college administrators colluding with private, for-profit
student loan providers existing outside the academia world, the
academic perpetrators exist within the academia world.
:11:1.
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Academic Fraud

Another form of higher education corruption is academic
fraud. In their book Fraud and Education: The Worm in the
Apple, authors Harold Noah and Max Eckstein say that, "The
major incentive to cheat in school, college, university, and the
professions, to plagiarize, fabricate research, and offer false
credentials, derives from the intense competitive pressures
that have built up everywhere in contemporary societies and
their institutions."40 They then continue: "Universities compete
vigorously for federal government research contracts, and
among researchers themselves the quest for grant money is a
major preoccupation." 41 The issues of cheating and plagiarism,
thought to be widespread among students, also exist among
faculty. Arguably the most serious and widespread forms of
corruption in academia, cheating and plagiarism are thought to
corrupt the purpose and mission of higher education, but they
are not easily regarded as corruption in the legal sense. While
student loan fraud schemes have identifiable monetary
incentives, quantifiable in dollars and cents, cheating and
plagiarism erode the core of academia, resulting in exponential
social costs.

D.

Misconduct in University-Industry Relations

Most scholars of corruption in higher education focus not on
financial misconduct, faculty wrongdoing, and academic fraud,
but instead concentrate on misconduct in university-industry
relations. Indeed, the academic integrity of university
researchers appears to be at stake every time corporate
interests are involved. This notion and practice of misconduct
in university-industry relations may relate to research,
scholarship, or even legal scholarship, when it comes to giving
expert testimonies on particular issues of importance to
corporations, the state, and the general public.
Scholarly misconduct in the sciences, as well as the complex
relations between academia and industry, comes in many
forms:
The list [of intersections between industry and academia]

10.

HAROLD NOAH & MAX ECKSTEIN, FRAUD AND EDUCATION: THE WORM !01 THE

i\PPLJ' lcl6-l cl7 (2(J(Jl).
11. !d.
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includes. for example, contractual arrangements between a
corporation and a university, technology transfer, strategic
research alliances, and spinoff companies. Despite the
literature's broader conceptualization of academic capitalism,
its primary reference point remains the exchange of funding
and research between a corporation and a university, or
variations on this exchange. 42

The methodology of investigating corruption in American
higher education also falls in the realm of possible abuses of
academic integrity where research may be influenced by
funding from outside corporations. 43 In studying how corporate
influence corrupts higher education, one author points out the
dangers that arise:
Corporate funding of universities is growing and the money
comes with strings attached. In return for this funding,
universities and professors arc acting more and more like forprofit patent factories: university funds arc shifting from the
humanities and the less profitable science departments into
research labs, and the skill of teaching is valued less and less.
Slowly hut surely, universities are abandoning their
traditional role as disinterested sources of education.
alternative perspectives, and wisdom. This growing influence
of corporations over universities affects more than just today's
college students (and their parents); it compromises the
future of all those whose careers depend on a university
education, and all those who will he employed, governed, or
taught by the products of American universities. 44

The funding effect is directly related to the conflict of
interest that emerges every time the research is funded by an
outside for-profit entity. Moreover, the conflict of interest and
the possible bias in reporting research results is not confined to
relations between universities and for-profit entities; it can also
be found in the relationships between universities and the
states.
An example of such a complex conflict of interest is

1~. Melissa Amh:rson. The Complex llclutions between the Academy and Industry:
Vieli's from the Literature. 72 ,J. 01-' HI<:HJ•:n EllLIC. ~~(), ~,11 (~001): see also Ml·:uss.\
,\l\Jli.:J{S0:-.1,
Uncouering thl' Couert: Hesearch on Academic Misconduct, in
1'1·:1\SPI·:CTIVI•:S ON SCHOLAI\LY MISCONIJLJ(''J' 1'\ Till·: SCIENCES (,John Braxton ed., HI~~).
·l:l. See Ararat Osipinn, fntwstiguting Corntption in American Higher l~ducation:
The Methodology, •1 TilE FEJJUNI ,JOUI\Ni\1. OF H lf:tilm ElllH'XI'ION ·19 (~000).

11. JENNIFEI\ W.\SII BUilN, THE COili'OIL\TE COI\IWPTION OJ! AMEIOC,\N HI< :H El\
EllLICi\'1'101'\ 1 (2005).
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research on the negative effects of smoking, where researchers,
universities, the tobacco industry, the government, healthcare
service providers, and the general public are involved. It may
well be the case that research universities tailor their findings
if their research is funded by the government, healthcare
industry, or pharmaceutical companies, and in a way that
allows them to cater to their sponsors' needs and expectations.
For instance, if a team of researchers have results of a
preliminary study showing that tobacco smoking causes
reduction in the level of obesity among youth, then they are not
likely to receive governmental funding for their major research
project, because the government does not want to encourage
smoking in order to fight the epidemics of obesity. At the same
time, tobacco companies may become interested and eager to
fund this kind of research, where certain results, favoring the
industry's product, are expected by the company management.
The conflict of interest rises not because researchers accept
funding from external agencies, but because they have
incentives to alter the design of the research plan and/or
misreport or underreport the results, while trying to please
their sponsors and secure future grants. At the same time,
external sponsors are de facto interested parties, expecting
certain results from the researchers as a return on their
investment, made in the form of grants. The results of the
research affect the sponsors, and this effect may be both
positive and negative.
Expert credibility and academic honesty are important
when it comes to testimonies on cases which involve large
companies and significant financial resources. Some scholars,
in addressing the issue of wrongdoing in assessing empirical
research where interests of major corporations are at stake,
have concluded that "[r]eliability, validity, and transparency ..
. are the most prominent standards empirical researchers use
to assess the integrity of research. Clearly the legal academy
has some work to do to better signal its commitment to them.
But just as clearly these standards-not the Court's
approach-are the best available criteria to detect bias in
research." 45 Another scholar, studying the Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker case in the context of academic integrity, 46 analyzed
15. Lee Epstein & Charles Clarke, Academic Integrity and Legal Scholarship in
the Wahe of l~xxon Shipping, 21 STAN. L. & l'OL'Y REV. :3:3, 50 (2010).
16. 12S. S. Ct. 2605, 2626 (200S).
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the integrity of sponsored law and economics research used in
lawsuits that involve significant potential punitive damages,
and made the following remarks:
If the academic enterprise is ultimately a quest for truth and
understanding, it should not he receptive to attempts by
outsiders to steer the direction of that quest to their
ideological or economic advantage. The Exxon-funded
punitive damages research is therefore troubling from the
perspective of the integrity of the law and economics
discipline. Had the academic journals and the university
presses that published the research been aware of both the
provenance and the narrow pecuniary purpose of its sponsor,
they arguably should have declined to publish it out of respect
for the integrity of the discipline, just as ,Justice Souter
declined to rely on it out of respect for the integrity of the
appellate proceeding. Similarly, as members of the academic
discipline, the scholars who conducted and published the
research should have, out of respect for the integrity of the
discipline, declined to accept Exxon's support at the outset. 4 7

The not-so-hypothetical question of who the researchers
really are~independent scholars or hired guns~comes to mind
every time significant awards are involved in court disputes. In
researching and commenting on this type of corruption,
authors use such terminology as "sponsor-controlled research,"
"secret sponsorship," "independence," "disclosure," "appearance
of control," "integrity of the discipline," and so on, all of which
point to the presence of the strong influence of corporations on
research and researchers.
Another author has studied transparency, objectivity,
disclosure, conflict of interest (and potential conflict of
interest), and professional ethics in sponsored research.
Focusing on physician disclosure of gifts and honoraria, the
author identifies "four ethical grounds for managing or
proscribing conflicts of interest among university faculty":
They can be characterized by the terms stewardship,
transparency, consequentialism, and integrity of science.
Stewardship pertains to the responsibility for the proper
management of public funds and resources used in carrying
out research. Transparency requires that the methods,
sources of materials, background literature, contributions of

17. Thomas McGarity. A Moucment, a /,uwsuit, and the lnte.~·rity of Sponsored
Luw and /~('()nomics Ueseurch. 21 STAN. L. & l'oL'Y l{EV. 51, 77 (2010).
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authors to the research project, and limitations to the study
are made available to the reviewers, journal editors, and
readers. Consequentialism refers to the link between a
behavior (such as a COl) and the quality of the research
outcome (such as bias). Finally, integrity of science speaks to
the public confidence in the scientific enterprise, which could
be compromised despite complete transparency and an
outcome of objective scicnce. 4 x

Two other scholars argue that corporate manipulation of
research is based on similar strategies across five industries:
tobacco, pharmaceutical, lead, vinyl chloride, and silicosisgenerating industries (mining, foundries, and sandblasting). 49
They argue that, "ultimately, conflicts of interest need to be
eliminated, not just managed." 50

E.

Diploma Mills and Degree Fraud

There has been some debate about whether the presence of
diploma and degree mills should be considered an area of study
of corruption in higher education. On one hand, the issue of
diploma mills and degree mills is directly related to the higher
education sector and is also considered as a part of corruption.
On the other hand, it has little to do with the core function of
academia, and thus may oftentimes be omitted from research
on corruption in higher education. The diploma mills industry
is somewhat similar to the illegal industry of fake IDs; it
specializes in production of fake educational certificates,
diplomas, transcripts, and other documents that certify
educational credentials of their holder. Diploma mills are
private on-line operated entities that issue their own worthless
degrees or produce fake educational documents that replicate
those issued by accredited colleges and universities. The
problem of diploma mills must be solved by legislation, largely
because "state lawsuits against diploma mills have often been
ineffective, doing little more than causing a diploma mill to
relocate to a different jurisdiction from which it continues to
1H. Sheldon Krimsky, Combating the Funding l~ffect in Science: What"s Beyond
21 STAN. L. & I'OL'Y REV. 81, 84 (2010).

Transparency~,

19. ,Jenny White & Lisa Hero, Corporate Manipulation of Research: Strategies Are
Similar Across Fiue Industries, 21 STAN. L. & I'OL'Y REV. 105, 106 (2010).
50. /d. at 1 ::l:l. For a review of major forms of academic fraud that exist in the
modern higher education sector, including its social causes and institutional responses,
see Richard Epstein, Academic Fraud Today: Its Social Causes and Institutional
Responses, 21 STAN. L. & i'OL'Y REV. 1::35 (2010).
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sell its product unimpeded." 51
IV.

A.

LEGALITY VEHSUS C(mHUPTTnTLlTY

Perspectives on Corruption: Legal, Economic, Social, and
Moral/ Ethical Responsibility

Not all illegal acts that take place in higher education
constitute acts of corruption. At the same time, not all acts that
are commonly understood as corrupt are immediately or
explicitly
qualified
as
illegal.
Broader
conceptual
understanding of corruption is needed. Legality and
corruptibility may be dominating characteristics of a corrupt
agreement. Corruptibility denotes possibilities for abuse and
vulnerability of the system overall, while legality implies
certain laws set by the public through the state or the ruling
regime. The issue of legality versus corruptibility is appealing
in the sense that it pos1t10ns intents, possibilities,
opportunities, mere expectations, and public trust against such
specific terms as public office, size of a bribe, fact of bribery,
etc. It allows for more space for a productive discussion, not
limited by the strictly legal terminology and not bound within
the limits oflegal rationality.
In
his article
Conceptualising the Context and
Contextualising the Concept: Corruption Reconsidered, David
Arora singles out four perspectives on corruption, including
legal, historico-cultural, public interest, and market-centered
approaches. 52 The four perspectives offer a broader scope for
understanding responsibility than does a standard legal frame.
"According to Arora, the main advantage of adopting a legal
perspective on corruption is that it 'enables an agreement over
the definition and ... scope of its study.' It therefore involves
defining corruption in terms of behavior which deviates from
the legal norms of public office." 53 Another author presents a
review of conceptual approaches to the issue of corruption.
outlines primary and secondary corruption, and points to the
:") 1. Gt·orgt• Collin. Emily Lawn• net' & /\Ian Contn•1·as. Complexities in IA•gislatil'<'
Suppression oliJiploma Mills. :21 STAN. L. & PoJ,'y J{J.;y_ 1.:2 (:2010).
fi2. David Arora. Conceptualising the Context and Contextuulising the ( 'onccpt:
Corruption lleconsidered, :l9 IN!l!AN.J. OF I'll!:. 1\DMIN. 1 (199:l).
i'i:l. l'd('r Hodgkinson. The Sociology o/ Corruption: Some ThciiH'S and Issues. :n

Soc. 17, 11-1 (1997).
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weaknesses and possible pitfalls of marketization m public
services. He suggests that:
[t]he attempt to model public service organizations on private
enterprise is meant to align the former with a changed socioeconomic environment. The basic premise being that the
success of the private sector model can be replicated in the
public services. Marketisation has therefore involved a
movement from "budgetary" to "for-profit" organizations. 54

In addition to legal perspective, there might be numerous
other perspectives employed, including historic, cultural, public
interest, and market-centered perspectives. Another approach
anticipates possible conceptual frames based on legal,
economic, social, moral, and ethical responsibilities. The
multiplicity of approaches makes it possible to fully appreciate
the complexity of legal issues that emerge and develop in the
higher education sector in the context of economic, social, and
political processes.
Economic processes and determinants are the most
influential in any segment of social life, including the higher
education sector. The economic responsibility appears to be
fundamental for modern HEis. As applied to higher education,
a legal lens uses the existing laws and regulations that
highlight complex processes occurring in the education sector
in order to sort out legal and illegal ones. It appears to be a
simple task, at least in theory, but when it comes to the
application of laws and legal precedents to specific
circumstances in the higher education sector, the legal frame
becomes insufficient. It prevents from fully understanding the
underlying structure of incentives that make agents commit
certain crimes and the economic and financial context in which
these crimes are committed. The economic responsibility
anticipates compliance with mutually accepted economic
obligations under which violations of such obligations are
considered a breach of contract. Reduced class time, increased
class size, absence of office hours held by faculty members, and
unfavorable lending terms and conditions on educational loans
may be considered a breach of contract. While not necessarily
specified in laws and legal provisions for higher education, such
practices may be interpreted as a violation of economic
responsibility.
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The social responsibility frame is even more complex than
legal and economic responsibility frames. Some may call it a
public interest perspective, as noted by Arora. 55 Public interest
perspective refers to the common well-being or general social
welfare, and the social responsibility frame implies the
dominance of similar priorities. This frame anticipates that the
HE! adheres to all legal and economic obligations and. in
addition, performs its societal duties. I<~ducational, research,
cultural, and other considerations are taken into account. The
social responsibility frame views the HEI as an organization
that conducts responsible research for the betterment of
society, educates members of society in accordance with the
best standards available, and disseminates knowledge to those
who arc in need of it. Monetary transactions and the financial
prosperity of an institution of higher learning are secondary in
such cases. This is also known as a service for public good that
increases total social welfare of the society.
Finally, the moral or ethical responsibility is meant to move
HE! to prioritize the issue of equity over the issue of quality,
and quality over access. If, under the economic responsibility
frame, a university sets its admission criteria and regulates the
quality of educational services offered based on demand and
supply in the education market, then the ethical responsibility
anticipates equality in access to education and the provision of
highest quality educational services under the conditions of
maximizing the position of learners and the society overall
rather than of profit maximization.
While ethical, social, and economic frames are more
universalistic, the legal responsibility frame is clearly nationspecific. On the one hand, economic structures in the education
sector vary by country and can be assigned to a few basic
models. These basic models characterize access to higher
education, funding of higher education, involvement of the
state in financing and decision-making, organization and
financing of research activities and dissemination of research
results, and other fundamental aspects of higher education
sector organization and functioning. On the other hand, legal
perspective can allow for future perspectives rather than
simple comparisons. As different national higher education
systems develop and their regulation and legislations change,
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laws reflect such changes and developments. Experiences of
other nations and comparative perspective as applied to higher
education corruption are of little help, because the U.S. higher
education system is unique in the way it is organized and
funded. The U.S. higher education sector may be described as
decentralized, market-oriented, and autonomous. Other
developed nations, including the European Union, have
centralized higher education sectors that may be characterized
by weak links with businesses and slowly emerging marketlike practices. Educational loans are becoming more common in
these developed nations. Hence, national legislations already
reflect such practices and will most likely develop further.
Recent dramatic increase in the fees charged in HEis in the
United Kingdom is a good example of such a change. While the
process of commoditization of higher education in the United
States continues, it is only emerging in Europe.
Corruption is broader than it is defined in legal cases. At
the same time, the level of legal responsibility from the set of
legal, economic, social, moral, or ethical responsibilities is used
to qualify deeds as corrupt. But even this approach docs not
cover all the areas. There are so-called grey areas that may be
judged as corrupt, while not illegal. Norms of contractual
behavior accepted by society go ahead of legislation. The series
of investigations launched by the New York State Attorney
General is a classic example of grey area application. The
Attorney General investigated numerous HEis of the matter of
fraud and conflict of interest in the triangle of relations
between students as consumers of educational services,
financial institutions as providers of student loans, and HEis'
financial officers as facilitators of such transactions. Later,
study abroad programs offered by HEis also fell under the
investigation in addition to the student loans schemes and
preferred student-loan providers lists. These series of
investigations and the ways in which the problems under
investigation were resolved leads to new, more precise, specific,
and contextual interpretation of existing laws, and results m
new provisions, regulations, and codes of conduct.

B.

Selection of Cases

The U.S. case law regarding corruption in higher education
includes: collusion and fraud in educational lending,
questionable quality of educational programs, the manner of
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credentials evaluation and accreditation, attempts to
monopolize discretion over admissions decisions. research
misconduct, embezzlement of university funds, and general
fraud. 56 Some of these cases are broadly publicized in the
media and discussed in scholarly literature. 57 Others are only
briefly mentioned in the specialized media sources that focus
on problems of higher education, even though they may
represent a legal precedent with a potentially large future
impact on the industry. 5 x These cases are significant and affect
H B~ls, as well as educators, students, parents, and the general
public. The cases to he analyzed are at the core of the
development and reform of the higher education industry. They
reflect processes of decentralization, commercialization, and
marketization of higher education. The case law also exposes
problems with the coordination, quality assurance, and state
control in the industry.
The selection criteria restrict the study to significant cases
of corruption in higher education, hence preserving a higher
degree of relevance for this study, while at the same time
maintaining a reasonable level of abstraction to retain clarity
of the issues surrounding the cases. For instance, if the United
States Code Service (U.S.C.S.) reports on a case of
embezzlement of public funds committed by an administrative
staff member in a public HEI, such a case will not he
considered in this study. First of all, embezzlement is not
limited to the higher education sector. This practice is not
distinct but rather common for all industries, including both
public and private sectors. Second, if the case of embezzlement
is clear, it is therefore not worthy of study. However, the way
the court determined whether the case should he considered
under the corruption law may be of interest, as it implies a
problem of definitions. ln a hypothetical case whl~re a
university administrator and a custodian or subcontractor
collude in order to unlawfully benefit from a certain operation,
a court will only consider the case if the net benefit obtained in

:)(). See court cases and decisions, Wr,st's Federal Practicr• Digest ,Jth, 1 KA-1 KB
(1999): and West's Fe<kral Practice Digest 1th. 1KB. CumulativP Annual l'ockPt Part
(2007).
:)7. Sec SYKI·:c:. supra note :l9 (discussing tfw price fixing investigation of Lhr• socalled overlap group in 1991 ).
61-\. See Martin VanDer Wr,rf. Lawsuit U, THE CHIWN. OF lli<:Ht·:li EllU<' .. Aug. 1.
200ti. at A2:l, rwailablc at htLp:l/chronicle.com/article/Lawsuit-U/19(i6K.
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an illegal way sums up to $5,000 or higher. If, however, the net
benefit adds up to less than $5,000, the state statutes on
corruption will not apply. Hence, if a public university overpaid
a private contractor for the services rendered as a result of
improper
collusion
between
the
administrator
and
subcontractor, the court will focus on the sum of the immediate
damage. This study tends to focus on the nature and essence of
a particular misdeed, rather than on the net benefit and the
appropriate statutory limitations that may apply, depending on
the state legislation. Simply put, for the court, the issue is both
illegality and the size of illegally obtained benefit, while for
this study the case of corruption exists no matter whether the
total benefit was more or less than $5,000. In addition, if an
alleged collusion took place between relatives, then this study
would classify such a case as an example of embezzlement,
nepotism, and fraud. Another limitation is concerned with clear
cases of corruption. In such cases, no additional research is
needed to establish the case of corruption, since it was already
established by the court.
C.

Analysis and discussion

Many of the cases of corruption in higher education,
including those discussed and analyzed in this paper, were
settled out of court. The fact that there are few court cases
means rare legal precedents in corruption in higher education
can really be drawn out for legal analysis. The analysis and
discussion is organized to expand on the notion of grey areas in
the higher education sector brought upon by the lack of case
law on the matter. The analysis and discussion of the cases
presented in this study seek to answer the following questions.
First, what is the essence of each case? What are the
underlying interests of groups involved, including consumers
and providers of educational services, regulatory authorities,
legislators, and the state in general? Second, is the case new, or
were there earlier precedents or attempts to create a precedent
on a similar case? Third, are there new ways to interpret the
old rules and laws that are used in the case? Fourth, how is the
case positioned in the context of educational reforms and socioeconomic processes in society in general?
As demonstrated by the questions above, this study is
focused on addressing sequences of events or case law, namely:
any existing or possible commonalities or fundamentals,
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similar fundamentals, socio-economic context, trends in the
education industry, and processes of modernization and reform
in society.
There is also an additional set of questions that may be
addressed in the analysis and the discussion. First, what is the
degree and direction of the governmental interference in each
of the cases? Here, we attempt to consider the government in a
broader sense than just a legislative branch that includes
prosecutors and the court system. Second, what are the
possible future implications of the processes, cases, and legal
decisions made? Are there any spillovers or potential for
spillovers on other national educational systems? Broader
spillovers into the European Union and the developing nations
may be possible. Third, do the findings support our definition of
corruption in higher education?
D.

Discussion of cases

Several corruption cases involve universities recmvmg
federal funds when they may have been ineligible. These types
of cases involve receipt of federal funds when ineligible, loan
provider monopolies, corrupt admission practices, federal grant
spending, educational quality fraud and research fraud, and
false advertising. For example, a case involving the University
of Phoenix points to federal funds received by the University in
the form of student aid. 59 The University might have been
ineligible because of non-compliance with certain federal laws
and regulations. The case was developed on the grounds of the
False Claims Act and anticipated possible fraud between state
and university relations. 60 The University of Phoenix case is
not an exception when it comes to allegations and even charges
of a large-scale fraud in the higher education sector. A similar
case involves Chapman University, which received federal
funds in the form of student aid, but might have been ineligible
as we11. 61 The major challenge in the Chapman University case,
considered in 2006, was the instruction time necessary to
receive credit hours. As a result, students might have been
defrauded because of insufficient instruction time, and the
S9. $:JSII-A1illion .Judgment Against If. of l'hoenix<> Parent Companv Is
Neinstutcd. 'l'IIE Ci!I{()"'ICLJ•: OF HJ(:I!Jm EllLJCATION, .Jmw ~:l. ~010. cwuiluhlc ut
http:l/chronich,.com/blogl'osti~HO-Million-.Judgnwnt-Against-/25(H(j/.

60. !d.
61. Sec Van Der Werf. supra note• 77.
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state was defrauded as well. The state offers educational loans
to students enrolled in accredited colleges. If it were known
that the university failed to provide sufficient instruction, it
would not be accredited and, hence, its students would not be
eligible for state financial aid. 62
Corruption can also take place in student-university
relations and in state-university relations. In 2007, New York
State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo launched an
investigation to uncover some suspicious practices related to
the lists of preferred providers of student loans administered
by colleges' financial aid officers. 63 The government conducted
the investigation on the basis of students being defrauded and
guided to more expensive loans by college administrators. The
case under investigation points to possible attempts to
establish a near-monopoly and to defraud students on the local
markets of educational loans. Students receive financial
educational loans through university financial aid officers.
These officers, as university employees, are subject to rules and
regulations set by the university in accordance to the federal
law. Universities have to comply with the federal government if
they receive federal funding in any form. Thus, the state and
students may be defrauded by the university due to
noncompliance of some of the university's officers-particularly
financial aid officers. 64
Another broadly publicized case initially involved Stanford
University, but was later joined by a few other colleges. 65 The
major considerations of the case were overhead payments of up
to seventy-four cents on every dollar received in the form of
federal grants, and also issues with how some of the federal
()2.

Jd.

J~xpansion of
lnuesti!{ation into Potential Conflicts of Interest in the Student Loan Industry, STi\TE OF
NEW
YORK
OFFICE
OF
THE
ATTOI\NEY
GENERi\L,
Feb. 1,
2007.
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2007/feh/feh01a_07.html.
61. !d.
65. United States Biddle v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford ,Jr.
University, No. 96-16911 (9th Cir. 1997), auailable at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us9th-circuit/1271717.html ("Paul Biddle appeals the district court's dismissal of his
cause of action f()f lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Biddle brought a qui tam lawsuit
against the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford, Jr. University ('Stanford')
pursuant to the False Claims Act ('FCA'), :n U.S.C. § ::l7:JO, alleging that Stanford
defrauded the United States Government. Because the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Biddle's lawsuit, we affirm."). See also Press Release, Lawsuit
A!{ainst Stanford University Dismissed, STi\NFORO UNIVI•:RSI'I'Y NEWS SERVIn:, Aug.
29, 1996, available at http://news.stanford.edu/pr/96/960829lawsuit.html.

6:l. Press l{elease. Attorney General Andrew Cuomo l-aunches Broad
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research money was spent, including the centerpiece of the
scandal-a yacht. 66 The case implied possible fraud in stateuniversity relations. Stanford University reached an out of
court agreement with the government and the university
reported that "The agreement between the university and the
Office of Naval Research (ONR) settles all disputed matters
related to the billing and payment of indirect costs of federally
sponsored research at Stanford for the fiscal years 1981
through 1992. In addition to finding that the government has
no claim for wrongdoing, the settlement upholds the validity of
'Memoranda of Understanding' previously reached between the
government and the university." 67 The initial allegations and
claims made by the government totaled $200 million, which in
2012 would mean around a half-a-billion dollars, but the
university eventually paid the government only $1.2 million.('X
The culture of denial of any wrongdoing is obviously present in
this case, as follows from the letter of the President of Stanford
University. 69 Along with the culture of denial, the focus on the
university's central mission always comes to play when
external allegations are made by the outsiders. Moreover, the
university manages to rip the benefit from this apparent crisis,
with its president stating that, "As we put this matter behind
us, we rea1ize that Stanford did harvest some benefit from this
episode. We did obtain a thorough outside review of our
internal controls, and we tightened them and improved our
systems." 70

()(). ;\:-.JIJEI!c;O)i. supra note :Hl. at 170-71.
()7. Stanford, gouenunent Cl,l.{l'('(' to settle dispute oPer research costs. ST.\:-.ii'OI{Il
SI·:I!VICI·:.
Oct.
1H.
1 !J~H.
rwuilable
ut
http://twws.stanfonl.edu/
N 1-:ws
pr/~J-1/9-11 018Arc 10~JO.html.
l1K. "Umh:r tPrms or tlw sl'ttiPnwnt, th<' univr:rsity will pay $1.2 million to th('
govc:nmwnt in a final adjustment covpring th(' 12 yr:ars and withdntw its own claims
that tlw univPrsity had br•c:n undPrpaid during 1991 and 1992 ... Tlw agn•r•nwnt <'tHis
sc:vl'ral yPars or contl·ovprsy during which aiiPgations wl'n' madP that tlw univr·t·sit:.owPd thP govr•rnnwnt as much as hundn:ds of millions of dollars f(,r incorrpctly
calculating thr· indirPct costs of doing n:sr•arch. Ovr•1· thl' coursr· of thPsl' 12 vr•ars,
Stanf(Jrd crmductpd n•s<'arch undl'r nParly 18.000 f(:dc:rall.v sponson•d contracts and
gr;mts involving many millions of transactions and dollars." !d.
()9. "Wr• Y'l'I-,'Tl'l thl' c:rrors and inappropriatr• chargr·s. But Wl' also n•gn•t
irn•sponsihll' accusations questioning thl' intPntions and intPgrity of Stanfiml and
univPrsity officials. Throughout this controvr•rsy. wr• ass('rtr•d that Stanford has donl'
no wrong. This sdll('nwnt confirms that helir:f. Wr: conciudr: this sl'ltlr•nwnt with a
spnsr• of l'('Jipf. With it br:hind us, Stan tim! can dr•votl' its attPntion fully to its ongoing
mission of tr•aching and n•sr:arch on tlw fronti('rs of know!r-dgr•." !d.
70. !d.
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Cases built on the grounds of anti-trust regulation have
also been considered. One of the major cases that attempted to
establish possible corruption in admissions involved the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a number of Ivy
League colleges in 1990. 71 The colleges were making
agreements with each other prior to admitting graduate
students in order to reduce the total cost of offerings in the
form of scholarships and financial aid. Instead of competing for
the best and brightest student candidates among themselves by
offering these students highest bids, these universities formed
an improvised pool or a cartel. This implies monopoly in
admissions, collusion, and consumer fraud. The colleges
admitted wrongdoing and stopped the practice. 72 The only
exception was MIT, which fought back and won on appeal,
pointing to its non-profit status:
All of the Ivy League schools signed a consent decree agreeing
to stop the challenged cooperative activity. MIT refused to
sign and went to trial. In September of 1992, MIT was found
to have violated the Sherman Act. Government investigations
against several schools outside of the Ivy League continued.
Soon after the trial ended, Congress passed the Higher
Education Act of 1992, allowing colleges and universities to
engage in certain cooperative conduct aimed at concentrating
aid only on needy students. In September of 1993, the court of
appeals overturned the district court's verdict and ordered a
new trial. The Government subsequently dropped all
investigations against other schools and reached a settlement
with MIT that allows MIT to engage in most of the conduct
that the Government had challenged. 73

71. "In 1991, the U.S. Department of .Justi~e's Antitrust Division ('the
Government') sued the Massachusetts Institute of '[\,chnology ('MIT') and the eight
colkges and universities in the 'Ivy League'-Brown University, Columbia University.
Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard College, Princeton University, the
University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University. According to the Government, thP
nine schools violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a conspiracy to
restrain price competition for students receiving financial aid. The Government
claimed that the schools conspired on financial aid policies in an effort to reduce aid
and therdJy raisl' their revemws." GUSTAVO K BAMBEI(GER AND DENNJS W. CAI{LTON.
Al'\TITRUST ANIJ HICHEI{ [•;DUCATlON: MIT FINANCIAL AID Hl8 (199::l), available at
http://www .oup.com/us/pdt/kwoka/97HO 195:l22972 __ 07. pdf.
72. "'The schools responded that the Sherman Act did not apply to them becausl'
they ane not-for-profit institutions. Furthermon,, they justified their woperative
behavior by explaining that it enabled them to ~oncentrate aid only on those in need
and thereby helped the schools to achieve their socially desirable goals of "need-blind"
admission coupled with finan~ial aid." /d.
7:3. Jd. at 189 (internal citations omitted). See also U.S. v. Brown University,
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It is within the Attorney General's purview to prosecute
cases that imply monopolistic agrecments. 74
In their article Complexities in Legislative Suppression of
Diploma Mills, George GoUin, Emily Lawrence, and Alan
Contreras discuss the legislative aspects of the problem of
diploma mills, concluding: "We believe that the legal and
enforcement components of the solution lag behind, and arc
deserving of greater attention from federal authorities in the
United States." 75 They further discuss the federal interest in
regulating diploma mills, and the problems that the
government faces:
There is a natural federal interest in helping the states
suppress the illegal sale of academic degrees. But the only
organized federal response to the problem of diploma mills
was discontinued by the FBI in 1991, some years before the
Internet-driven boom in the degree mill business began.
Though it sued the "University Degree Program" in 200:3, the
Federal Trade Commission did so as a secondary action to
accompany its complaint regarding fake international drivers'
licenses that the organization had been selling. The few
criminal cases that have been brought in recent years have
relied on mail and wire fraud statutes. But degree mill
customers generally understand the true nature of the
product they purchase. In the recent prosecution of the St.
}{egis University diploma mill, the defense argued that there
was no fraud, since willing customers bought these diplomas
knowing they were not legitimate degrees. 76

A number of cases involving diploma mills included stateuniversity relations, consumer-university relations, and degree
holder-employer relations. 77 Cases of educational quality fraud

..t.al., SOG F. Supp. 2:-lil (I•:. D. Pa. 1~Hl2): U.S. v. Brown Uniwrsity. c>t a!., :) F.:ld (;;,s
(:lrd Cir. 19H:l).
71. 1\•oplc> v. Dorsey. 29 N.Y.S. G:l7 (N.Y. Co. Ct. HHI) (holding that tlw attorm•y
gc>Ill'ral had power to pros<Ocut.e for offpm·,•s committ.c>d a;; part of tlw nwan;;, phtn. or
ocfH'IllC by which violation;; of S;l,l(), prohibiting monopolil'S Wl'Y'l' l'fft•dc>d. and anY
criminal .act dom> in furtherancl' of a violation of such section was subj,·,·t to
inv<>sLigat.ion and prosl'cution by t.lw attorney gc>Iwnd).
75. (}eorgc> Collin. Emil:-' Lawn•nc" & Alan Contreras, Complexities in IA·.~·islative
Suppression of /Jiploma Mills. 21 ST,\:--J. L. & I'OL'Y l{t•:v. 1, :l2 (201 0).
7!;. !d. at :l (internal citations omitted).
77. See, j(Jr instance, lndictnwnt, Unitl•d State;; v. Ran dock. No. CH-05-01 ilO-LltS
(E.D. Wash. 200:-l), 2005 WL 5K9000(); 1\•rmanent Injunction and Final .Judgnwnt
Again;;t Dd'endant llassan II. Safavi at 2, Am. Univ. Haw .. Inc .. No. O:l-1-015il(:2)
(.Jww I :l. 20()(;), available at http://hawaii.gov/dcca/an•as/ocp/udgi/lawsuits/AUH/
american _u_hawaii_hhs.pdf.
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involve consumers or students, providers or colleges, and
accreditation agencies. Research fraud involves the state as the
major source of funding, while the medical fraud committed in
university hospitals involves patients and msurance
companies.
The cases of corruption in higher education selected for this
study include the most recent developments in college funding,
including ties between colleges and the educational loan
industry. The investigation initiated by the New York State
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo based on the False Claims
Act was followed by another twenty-seven states throughout
the country. As a result of the massive legal campaign
launched by Attorney General Cuomo, dozens of public,
private, and private for-profit colleges and about a dozen
private student loan providers agreed to comply with the ethics
rules offered by the Attorney General. n
Two other cases based on the False Claims Act include
Chapman University, a for-profit educational institution based
in California, 79 which was accused by the state of defrauding
its students, playing on the mismatch between students'
financial aid and academic abilities, and the case with the
University of Phoenix. The Higher Education Act prohibits
colleges and universities whose students receive federal
financial aid from paying their recruiters based on the number
of students enrolled. ~ 0 This provision is intended to discourage

78. Bill Schackner, Private Student /,oan Scandal Yields Reforms, PJTTSBUR(;H
POST-GAZETTE
(Feb.
12,
2008),
available at
http://www.post-gazl'ttP.com/
pg/0801:1/8Fi6700-298.stm#ixzz170GfKDc,D.
79. "A fl:deral judge in California on Tuesday ckared the way for three formc:r
adjunct professors at Chapman University to sue the institution under the Falsp
Claims Act, which permits lawsuits by an individual who hPliews he or she has
identifled fraud committed against the federal governmPnt, and who sues hoping to ht>
joined hy the U.S .•Justice Dc:partment. (The plaintiff then shares in any financial
pPnalties. which can include trebh:d damages.) In siding with those who sued
Chapman, Judge ,James V. Selna not only cited the' Seventh Circuit's decision in United
StatPs of America ex. rei. Jeffrey E. Main v. Oakland City University as a key
precedent, but expanded on it in significant ways. Most notably. the judge concludes
that a college can run afoul of the False Claims Act by violating a requirement imposed
not directly by the federal government but by an accrediting group-a position the
,Justice Department endorsed." Doug Lederman, l~ver-Expanding False Claims Act.
!:--.!SIDE HH:HER En, May 26, 2006, available at http://www.insidehighen:d.com/
news/2006/0Fi/26/false#ixzzldcqLUgDk. See also U.S. v. Chapman University, 2006 WL
1Fi622:ll (C. D. Cal. 20(J4).
80. Press Helease, Attorney General Andrew Cuomo Launches /Jroad l{xpansion of

Investigation into Potential Conflicts of Interest in the Student Loan Industry, STATE OF
NEW
YORK
OFFICE
OF
'I'HI•;
ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
Feb. 1,
2007,
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recruitment of unqualified students. If this provisiOn is
violated, then the False Claims Act may be enacted. In the case
of Chapman University, the complaint says that the
institution, as part of the accreditation process, certified that it
was giving the required amount of classroom instruction in its
academic programs, when it was not.x 1 If it had revealed the
truth, the complaint alleges, Chapman would not have been
accredited and would be ineligible to receive federal grants and
student loans. Xl
University of Phoenix is the largest private HEI in the
United States.x 3 This for-profit HEI enrolls over half-a-million
students, 80%> of which receive federal aid in the form of
student loans and grants.x 4 In the 2008-2009 academic year,
the University of Phoenix hosted 2:10,77 4 students recipients of
Pell Grants, receiving the revenue of 656,900,000.x 5 In 2008,
the total sum of financial aid received by the University of
Phoenix students amounted to almost $2.5 billion. The
http://www.ng.ny.gov/nwdia cl'ntpr/2007/fl'hift:b01a_07.html.
1-\1. "Tiw suit (O'Connell. ct al. L'. Chapman University), which was l'ilt•d undl'r tlw
fed('ral Faist' Claims Act. allcgcs that Chapman fa]sp]y rl'pn•st•ntl'd itst•lf during an
accn•ditation l'l'Vil'w in t>nll'r to quali(v for federal funds. Tlw United Staks Dis I riel
Court for Lhl' Cl'ntral District of California grantl'd summary judgnwnt in favor of I lw
univl'rsity in 2007. Tlw plaintiffs appl'~tlt•d to thl' U.S. Court of Appt•als for the Ninth
Circuit.
Tlw plaintiffs. who Wl'rt' adjunct facull:v nwmhl'rs. :tllegPd that hl'cansl' somt· facult~·
rPit:>lsPd studl'nts t•arl~· from sonw class('s. Chapman was not in compliann• with
anTt•ditat.ion standards. Chapman is fully :wcrPditt•d by Uw regional :ll'lTPdilor. the
WcstPrn Association of Schools and Collt•gl's." !1('/,' Submits Amicus /Jriel in Chapman
l!niuersity Accreditation Cuse. 'I'HI·: IIMI-:1{1('.\N COLI'H'IL 0:--1 l~llliC,\TION, .Junt• 1, 20m!.
cn·ailablc at http://www.acl'nl'l.l'du/AM/Tt•mplatl'.cfmSt•ction=l lome&( '(JNTENTIIJ=
:l2tiG7&TEM I'Ll\'I'E=/CM/Contl'nt!Jispla:v.cfm. Sec also lJ .S. ex rei. O'Conntdl v.
Chapman Univ .. 21fi F.IUJ. ()1() ({'.D. Cal. 2007). cert. denied. U.S. v. Chapman
Uniwn;ity.1:n S.Ct.2,112(2011).
1-\2. /d.
1-i:l. !\bout
l!niuersit.v
ol
l'hoenix,
UNI\'EJ(SJTY
01··
I'IIOI·::--JJ\,
http://www.phm·nix.t•du/about_us/about_uniwrsit:v of phm·nix.html (l:lst visitt•d Feb.
(i. 2012).
H·l. '''l'hl' UnivPrsity of l'hm~nix (UOI'X), with rwarlv mw half million sl udents, is
thP sr•cond largPst highr•r t,ducation s:vstl'm in Uw U.S., spcond on!~- t.o tlw Statr•
Univt~rsit:v of NPw York." .Jorge Klor dP Alva, Nn-- l'ro/it Colleges and Unirwrsities:
A111erica's !~east Costly and Most 8/ficient System o/llig11er J•;ducution Case Stu.dyUnir•asitv o/1'/wenix. l',\SJ•: S'i'L!ll!ES 01'\ I'UBJ,J(' I'OLI<'Y ,\Nil HICI!Im EllliC.\TIO"'. 27
(Aug. 201 0), htt.p:lltwxusn:sl'arch.org/11NPxusStudvi-i-:l1-1 O.pdf. See also .John
L~nwrman, For-l'roji:t Colleges Facing l~oss ol Taxpayer Funds Fighting Aid Ulllit.
BL<Hl~lllEIUi, -Jan. 12. 2011. http://www.bloomhPrg.com/nt:ws/20 11-01-12/for-pmfilcollegl's- facing- taxpayer- funds-loss- tlgh t-aid- Ii mit. h tm I.
1-\5. Nn·-f'rolit Colleges Capitalize on !'ell Grant HeiJelllli'. 'I'HI·: CHJ{()f\J<'LE OF
III<: HI•:H l•:lllll'Nl'ION. .Jan. -1, 2010, http://chronick.com/articlt>/Dal a -!'oint,;- Fm1'rofi t!():l:l81-i.
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allegations mounted that the University wrongfully obtained
around $3 billion in federal funds.x 6 This money was at stake
under the False Claims Act provision that requires the
recovery of triple the full amount of money. 117 The plaintiffs
(i.e., the whistleblowers) are entitled to 15%> or more of the
total recovered sum. xx It was unlikely from the very beginning
of this affair that the government would try to deprive the
University of Phoenix of billions of dollars for this sum is
simply way too big. Also, the whistleblower cases based on the
False Claims Act may be highly expensive, especially if they
proceed to trial.X 9 The $78.5 million settlement reached in
December of 2009 includes $11 million as statutory attorneys'
fees and costs. The whistleblowers received $19 million and the
U.S. Department of Education received $48.5 million. 90
It is interesting that the government declined to intervene
as a party plaintiff in the cases, but nevertheless received its
share of compensation money. In theory, all a whistleblower
has to do is to blow a whistle on a company that in his/her view
is involved in violation by committing fraud against the federal
government and then sit and wait to see how the case turns out
in order to collect his/her share. In reality, however, a
whistleblower has to find a private attorney first and then try
to convince the government to join in the legal action. But often
even this formula does not work. The government, not the
whistleblower, stays aside of the legal action awaiting its
outcome in order to collect.
Some cases involving corruption in higher education
involved claims of false advertising. For example, Corinthian
86. Admissions Lawsuit University of Phoenix Faces May Cost 80 Million.
GET EllUCATED.COM.
http://www .geteducated.com/online-education -facts -andsta ti stics!l a test-online-learning- news-and-research/:l02-a d missions-lawsuit-universityof-phoenix-faecs-may-cost-80-million (last visited Fe h. 6, 2012).
87. :n U.S.C. § :l729(a)(1) (2011).
88. 1:ypes
of
Fraud,
WHISTU:BlllWEf!LAWS.COM.
http://www.whistlchlowerlaws.com/types-of-fraud/ (last visited Fd>. 6, 2012).
89. The' Univc,rsity of Phoenix whistlehlower case (U.S. ex rei. Hendow v. Univ. of
Phoenix, Civil Action No. 2:0:1-cv-00157-GEB-DAD (KD. Cal. 2006)) settled after the
trial team reviewed over a million pages of documents, took or defended close to forty
depositions, and had retained several experts. The case was set to be tried in March
2010. hpfore the parties reachc'd settlemlmt in December of 2009. See $78.5 Million
Settlement in Whistlcblower Lawsuit against Unioersity of Phoenix, BLJSI0imiSWIHII,
De, c.
11.
2009,
http://www. husincsswirc.com/portal/sitc/homo/pennali nk/?
ndm View I d=news_view&ncwsl d=20091214006155&newsLang=cn.
90. Denny Walsh, Sacramento Whistle-Blowers to Share U. of Phoenix Settlement,
SAC:f!AME:-.1'1'0 BEE, Dec. 15, 2009, at :JA.
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Colleges, Inc. agreed to pay $6.5 million to settle allegations
that the for-profit operator of vocational schools engaged in
false advertising. 91 Corinthian Colleges, Inc. allegedly
overstated the percentage of its students who obtained
employment via its courses, inflated their starting salary
information, and used these misrepresentations to persuade
potential students to enroll. Of the settlement amount, $5.8
million went to restitution for students. 92 Corinthian operates
more than one-hundred other schools in the United States and
Canada. The settlement required that Corinthian cease
offering eleven courses for eighteen months, including the
Pharmacy Technician program in Anaheim, CA. 9 -' In the first
case, there was a settlement achieved and the university
ultimately agreed to a settlement of $6.5 million in restitutions,
penalties, fines, and compensatory payments, while the second
case was settled at $78.5 million after seven years of
litigationY4 The summary of the reviewed cases is presented m
Table 1.

91. l'ress i{elease. l!ro1N1 Ucuchcs Multi·Million Settlement with Corinthian
Voculionul School, S'i'i\'1'1<: OF CALJI<'OI(l\li\ DEI':\Il'l'l\11•:~'1' OF ,JlJS'I'In: (Ji.'l'l<'l•: OF TfH:
i\'i'TOI!NI·:Y G l·:~lm.\1 ..•July :n. 2007. http://oag·.ca.gov/news/press_n>lt>as<•'!id=1 •1·H.
92. Andrew (;alvin. Corinthian to l'ay $6.5 Million. OCI{I•:<:IS'I'I·:IC Aug. 1. 2007.
h ttp://articlt•s.ocregist.Pr.com/2007 ·Oil·O 1/husitwss/2·170il9:l2_ 1_cori nth i:~ n ·studt•n Li·
corinthian·collt>g<>s·sdt.lenwnt. Sec olso Closs Action Suit Filed Agoinsl Corinthian
Colleges, Inc. on lkhulf of Medical Assistant l'rogTwn Students, 1'1{ NI•:WSWIIn<:. Mar.
12.
2001-l.
http://www. pnwwswin:.com/m•ws· rp lt•ast•s/cl ass·action ·suit· filed ·against.
corinthian ·co II c:ges ·inc ·On· behalf. of. nwd iu t! ·ass is tan(. program ·S ttl' Ien Is·
ilti902•122.html.
~J:l. !d.
~H. $78.5 M1:Lll:on Settlement in Whistleblower tuwsuit A,<(uinst Uni1•ersity ol
l'hocnix.
IWSINI·:sc:WIIU:,
D<•c.
11.
20m1.
!1 ttp://www. busi twsswirP .com/port:~llsitc/home/pcrma li nk/'1nd 111 Vit>W Id=m•w,;-viPw&nt•
wsld=2009121100G15:)&nt>wsLang=cn. The lawsuit. fih;d in March 200:1. alleged that
tlw University' of l'h<"'nix had dd'raudt•d Lht• U.S. lkpartnwnt of Education bv
obtaining fedl'ral student loans :md ft•dPral grants bast•d on false statPnwnts of
complianet• with tht• Hight>r Education Act. The Univ<•rsity of Phoenix pt't>Viousl:-'
aln;ady paid $9.il million to tlw U.S. Dt>partnwnt of l•;ducation in 2001 to n>solvt•
:Hhninistr:Jt.ive cl:1in1s t.hat. it. was paying in1propPr incPntive cnnlpt•nsation to its
recruil.t>rs. In 2005, the trial judgt> dismisst>d thP action against tlw Univ<·rsity of
l'hm>nix on the ground that tlw Universitv's t't•rlifications of complianc<· with tht•
II ight•r Education Act did not constitutl> falst> clnims. In 2007. tlw ~inth Circuit
n•vt;rsed that ruling and thL• case; n;Lunwd to tlw trial court.
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Table 1: Cases on the Grounds of the False Claims Act,
Consumer Protection Act, Higher Education Act, and
Anti-Trust Laws after 2000
University Plaintiff

Ground

Date Date

Settlement

filed settlerl

(in millions)

Allegations Essence

Total Plaintiff
Uniwrsity Fonner

False

Mar. Dec.
200~l

of

employees

Claims

Phoenix,

(two

Act

Apollo

adn1issions

Group

officers)

Oakland

Former

False

Mar. July

City

employee

Claims

2003 2007

$78.5 $28.0

2009

Incentive

State and

pay fur

COnsumL'r

recruit-

fraud

ment

$5.3

$1.4

University (one director Act
of

Incentive

State and

pay for

consumer

recruit-

fraud

ment

admissions)
Chapman

Former

University employees
(three

False

Mar. Pending

[ nsufficicnt State and

Claims

2005

instruction consumer

Act

tim''

fraud

False

Consumer

instructors)
Corinthian State on

Consumer

July

Colleges

behalf of

Protectio

2007

Inc.

consumers, nAct

unfair

(class-

business

action)

practices

!~ducat ion

State on

Higher

Finance

he half of

Education 2007 2007

Partnurs
(private
student

action)

loan
provider)

$6.5

$5.8

advertising, fraud

Preferred

Consunu~r

student

fraud,

consumers, Act, Anti-

loan

kickback

(class-

providers

Trust

Mar. Apr.

$2.0

$0

list
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UniversiLv Plaintiff

Dozens of State on
public,

behalf of

<:round

!late llat<'

Higher

Mar. Fd1.

$HO $0

Education 2007 2008

PrPfc•rred

ConsunH•r

student

fraud.

kickback

private.

consumers, Act, Anti-

loan

and

(class-

providers

private

action)

Trust

[2012

list

for-profit
collt>gt•s; a
dozl'n
privatP
studL•nt
loan
providers

Source: Completed by the author
A few initial observations can be made about the presented
legal cases. First, all False Claims Act-based cases with
University of Phoenix, Oakland City University, and Chapman
University were initiated by former employees. In the case of
University of Phoenix, the whistleblowers were two admissions
officers. 95 In the Oakland City University case, it was the
Director of Admissions. 96 The Chapman University case was
initiated by three instructors who worked in precisely the areas
which they later targeted as being in violation of federal law. 97
In the first two cases, the issues were admissions policies and
practices, while in the third it was instruction time. The law
does not require plaintiffs or whistleblowers to be employees, or
former employees, or have any affiliation; they just need to
have knowledge of the violation. 9 s Either transparency in
operation of HEis is not very high, and so only immediately
involved employees have the knowledge that can potentially
form the necessary grounds for a legal challenge, or arguments
of outsiders will not even be taken seriously by the court.
Second, in all of the False Claims Act cases the government
~J:). UnivL:rsiLy of Phoenix, supm note tlH.
(Hi. U.S. l'X n•l. Main v. Oakland City UnivPrsity, 12() F.:ld (JH, 9](i (7th C'ir.
200:)). False Claims Act cha!'gl!S n:latl'd to submission of allL'gL•dly f'alsl' statL:nwnts to
tlw DL:partnwnt of Education in connection with eligibility to parLicipall' in thl' FPdL•ral
Stmknt Loan Program.
97. LL•dL•rman, supra notL: 79.
~J8. :n U.S.C. ~ :l729.
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has chosen to stay aside, limiting its involvement with citing
its opinion in the form of the prosecutor's statement. The
reason for this self-alienation is not particularly clear. Perhaps
the government decided that the law firms will do the work of
proving the case and seeking their legal fees while the
government and the plaintiffs will obtain their share. What
appears to be a cost-saving strategy on the side of the
government may actually have some repercussions.
Third, all of the lawsuits ended with out-of-court
settlements. The sides did not proceed to trial. Even though the
HEis adopted and reinforced some of their compliance policies,
precedent has yet to come.
Fourth, plaintiffs in the three False Claims Act-based cases
are employees, and not customers whose interests are at stake
of being jeopardized. Thus, the current legislation or the
factual legal practices do not appear to be sufficiently
protective of the customers. Rather than fight for consumer
rights, employees initiate such cases in pursuit of their own
benefits, which include the incentive of 15% of any recovery.
This contradiction will eventually move the existing legislation
to the need for updates and improvements. While the essence
of each of the three cases is "state and consumer fraud," it
appears that neither the state nor the consumers played the
key role in the lawsuits.
Fifth, these cases are complex and take years to settle. For
instance, the University of Phoenix case took over six years to
come to settlement. The government had little involvement in
the case and yet received the lion's share of the settlement
money, almost $50 million out of $78.5 million total. 99 At the
same time, the potential recovery, at least as follows from the
False Claims Act, could have constituted over a billion dollars.
Apparently, the government is not willing to pursue False
Claims Act cases in higher education to the point where HEis
can be left stranded without cash due to enormously high
recovery payments to the government. The government
recognizes ipso facto the existence of grey areas in the
legislation that it drafts and enforces. 100

99. Denny Walsh, Sacramento Whistle-Blowers to Share lJ. of Phoenix Settlement,
SACilAMENTO BEE, Dec. 15, 2009, at :lA.
100. Grey areas in this context are understood as refl)rring to conduct that may not
he recognized as corrupt, hut also pointing to possible loophoks in the existing
legislation.
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Sixth, the government sued or intended to sue on behalf of
consumers in the case of Corinthian Colleges, Inc. and the
cases initiated by Attorney General Cuomo, which involved
dozens of public, private non-profit colleges, and private forprofit colleges and a dozen of private for-profit student loan
providers, including Education Finance Partners. 101 Overall,
these cases involve unfair business practices, such as false
advertisement and partial monopolization of certain aspects of
educational financing, which amounted to consumer fraud and
resulted in kickbacks to college officials. Similar to the cases
based on the False Claims Act, the pretrial settlements in
these cases made it possible to avoid the creation of a legal
precedent.
The recent scandals of university financial aid officers,
preferred educational loan providers lists, and possible
kickbacks, investigated by Attorney General Cuomo, were
highlighted in numerous media publications and can be
analyzed through the proposed classification frame. Such
analysis will help reveal whether the cases represent
corruption of higher education and expose the essence of each
case. In some cases investigated by Attorney General Cuomo.
financial aid officers suggested a particular private banklender to students. 102 The bank may not have had the best
offerings for the students and would be ruled out otherwise.
The non-competitive bank loan offers attract clients, which
may constitute an act of fraud, a clear facet of corruption. What
follows, then, is a need to determine if this is an intentional
fraud or a result of negligence or incompetence.
Intentional fnud takes place if financial aid officers in
universities commit it with the expectation of personal or
material gain. Material gain can come through holding shares
in the bank placed on the preferred loan provider list or by
receiving kickbacks in the form of consultation fees, gifts, etc.
Thus, kickbacks here are the means of corruption. Banks might
pay kickbacks deceptively worded as referral affiliate benefit
packages to colleges' financial aid officers in the form of gifts.
meals, accommodations, consulting fees, travel expenses,

101. Press l{t•lease. Attorney General Andreu• Cuomo Announces First f~c.!.{u/ Action
in Co/lege l~omr lndustr:v lnuestigolion, ST.\TI·: <W NI·:W YOI{K 01-'FWI•: Ill-' THI·: AT'I'Oil:.JI·:Y
CI·:I\Eit\L,
Mar. :m.
2007,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/nwdia center/2007/mar/
mar22b 0/.html.
102. !d.
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registration fees, tuition waivers, and shares of the lending
agencies. 103 Being on the preferred lender list increases the
profitability of the bank, the profitability of the shares, and,
hence, the revenue of the shareholders. Such practices raise
several questions. Does this represent clear conflict of interest?
Is this illegal? Is this against the university rules? Are such
practices transparent? What rules are established and by
whom?
The locus of corrupt activities in this case includes access to
higher education and possible breach of contract. The area
primarily affected is access to higher education since a loan is
intended to fund the recipient's education. Educational loans
provided on non-competitive grounds reduce the degree of
accessibility of higher education, arc more likely to increase
student debt, and eventually lead to the withdrawal of more
competitive providers of educational loans from the market.
The practice of having a list of preferred loan providers may
also constitute a breach of contract between the student and
the university, if universities are under obligation to provide
their current and prospective students with the best possible
options in terms of educational loans, both private and public.
Even if they are not under such obligation, the legal problem
with kickbacks and preferred provider lists remains.
The potentially corrupt interactions in the presented cases,
investigated by Attorney General Cuomo, include businessuniversity relations with possible collusion between providers
of educational loans and universities or admissions officers.
They also include relations between students and college
administration, where administrators commit possible fraud by
presenting students with the preferred lenders list. Finally,
these are potentially corrupt interactions between the state
and HEis, including the investigations conducted and out-ofcourt settlements achieved, as well as restitutions and
voluntary acceptance of the code of conduct set by the state for
the future.

E.

Legal argumentation

The Higher Education Act of 1965 regulates the sphere of

10:1 ld. See also Charlene Wear Simmons, Student Loans for Hikher
CALIFORNIA

STATE

Lllll{ARY

i{ESEARCH

http :1/www .I i brary .ca. gov/crb/0/l/08-002. pdf.

BUREAU,

l~ducation.

available

at
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educational loans in the U.S. 104 However, some issues of
consumer rights protection as well as state jurisdiction are still
not clear. Parents can borrow a PLUS Loan to cover education
expenses for dependent undergraduate students enrolled at
least half-time in an eligible program at an eligible school. 105
PLUS Loans are available through the Federal Family
Education Loan (FFEL) Program and the William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program. 106 The eligibility of a student
requires a high school diploma, the eligibility of parents
requires good credit, and eligibility of the program and the
college requires accreditation. Conditions apply to all
governmental educational loans and to all the participants of
this type of contract or transaction. However, colleges arc not
under any responsibility to provide quality educational services
to students, and hence students cannot return the funds
received from state loans, if they have not received federal
loans. 107 Student loans made, issued, or guaranteed under the
Higher Education Act are also exempt from Federal Trade
Commission rules on preservation of consumer defenses. 10 ~
The issue of educational loans and all the abuse associated
with it extends beyond interactions between students and
colleges, since colleges themselves do not hold student loans.
The decision in Veal v. First Am. Sav. Banh states that the
"rule that assignee who is not holder in due course takes
instrument subject to defenses against assignor existing at
time of assignment could not be used to charge lenders who
granted guaranteed student loans with alleged fraudulent

101. Higlwr Education Act of 1%5, 20 U.S.C. ~ 1070 (200fi).
105. College /,ourz Options: /low lo '/HI a l'crhins from a J>LlfS. CoLLECI·: 1\(L\IW.
http :1/www .co II egt• board .com/,; tmk n t/p; zy/lo; tn-ct •n !t >r/·1 :l:l. h t mI.
1(Hi. /d.
107. Sec lliglwr I<:ducation i\ct of nlfi:-i. 211 U.S.C. ~ 10711: Vt•al v. First Am. S;tv.
Bank, 91•1 F.2d 909, 91 :l (7th Cir. 1990) ("Stmh,nts could not St><'k n>scission of studt•nt
lo<tns gu<u·anlped h:/ st.at.P nnd private agpncies on theory t.hat. heeausL~ of closL'
conm•ction hl'IW<'<'n solvc•nt lmsizwss colle>gc> and lenders and olfwr dl'ft·ndanL;,
defendants wen• subject to defense hase>d upon college's failurl' to provide stml<-nt with
t•ducation: since loans W<>rt• gu;u·antt•ed by pt·ivnte nnd stal<> agencil's. rat ht·r than
ft•dez·al govl'rnment, tlwy wr>n• not subjt>ct to protl'ctions of ft•dt•z·;tl n•gulations. under
which deft•nse might he available in cases involving Fedt,ral lnsun'd Studt•nt Lo;ms
and ft>dr>ral I'LLJS loans.").
Ill~. Vcol. 9H
F.2d at 9H (holding that studl'nt loans. madl', j,;,;twd. or
guantnt<'<><L undPr HighPr Education Act m·t, l'Xt>mpt from ft>dl'ral trndl' Commission
rull' on pn,st,rvation of consunwr ddi.•nse>s. under which consunwr credit. contracts
must advice holde>rs of such contracts that they an• subject to all claims and defl'nses
that dt,btor has against seller of goods and s<>rvice>s).
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activities of insolvent business college, since college was never
'holder' of student notes and lenders were never assignees of
college." 109 This provision points to the need to better educate
consumers about educational and affiliated financial services.
Consumers of educational services must be aware of the
quality, accreditation level, and the terms and conditions of
educational loans.
Attorney General Cuomo's investigations of educational
loans and study abroad programs were based on the deceptive
acts and practices provision of the Consumer and Borrower
Protection Act. 110 As stated in the New York State legislation,
"[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business,
trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this
state are hereby declared unlawful." 111 In cases of private
educational loans, the consumer and borrower protections
consider the borrower to be a consumer of financial services.
This requires transparency and full disclosure of the terms and
conditions under which the loan is furnished to the student.
The essential elements of a violation of New York law
prohibiting deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service
in New York are: "(1) proof that a 'consumer-oriented' practice
was deceptive or misleading in a material respect, and (2) proof
that plaintiffs were injured thereby." 112 There is, however, safe
harbor for lenders and college financial aid officers in the state
legislation. Specifically, the court does not accept claims about
deceptive practices when such practices have been fully
disclosed to the consumer. 113
The excursion into legal definitions and peculiarities leaves
many questions unanswered. For instance, both coercion and
extortion are considered in the U.S. legislation. However, the
bribe giver in coercion and extortion cases is considered to be a

109. /d.
110. .Justice Thomas A Dickerson, Consumer Law 2004 Update: The Judge's Guide
to Federal and New Yorh State Consumer Protection Statutes, THE NEW YORK STATE
.JUDICIAL
SI•;MINAR
PROGRAM
2001,
,July
21,
2001,
available
at
http://www .nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/2001CONJ ,A W AI{']'. pdf.
111. N.Y. GI•;N. Bus.§ iH9 (McKinney 201 0).
112. Champion Home Builders Co. v. AD'l' Sec. Services, Inc., 179 F. Supp.2d H:i,
27 (N.D.N.Y. 20ll1).
11:1. Broder v. MBNA Corp., 722 N.Y.S.2d 521, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("There
can he no sL•ction il19 (a) claim when the allegedly deceptive practice was fully
disclosed.").
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victim. But what about public employees and elected officials
who are coerced by their supervisors to so1icit bribes and accept
bribes? This anticipates the corruption and coercion policy as a
mechanism of administrative control. And what about complex
systems where bribes arc shared with supervisors and further
up the hierarchical ladder or the hidden schemes and
mechanisms of bribe collection and bribe sharing? The entire
legal frame appears to be quite simplistic while the corrupt
hierarchical structures, including those in the higher education
sector, may be quite complcx. 114
Legal provisions that exist in the legislation, including the
Higher Education Act, False Claims Act, and Consumer
Protection Act, cover the following three areas: (1) corruption
as related to the state (a private individual bribes a public
official in order to obtain unduly benefits); (2) corruption as
related to client and business (a client (subcontractor etc.) is
abusing a business by bribing the business' agent); and (:3)
corruption as related to consumer and business (consumer
fraud, when a business deceives a consumer). However, the
legal framework is simplistic, while the system of
interrelations in the higher education industry is rather
complex. The Higher Education Opportunity Act includes
provisions for education loans. 115 Specifically, the reauthorized
Higher Education Opportunity Act furnishes prov1swns
applicable to private student loans and specifies prohibited
conduct. preferred lender arrangements, disclosures to
borrowers, and self-certification. 116
II ,1. For furtlwr discussion on complex corrupt systems. see. for instanct'. Ararat
Osipian, Corruption Hierarchies in lhgher /•,'ducution in the I•!Jnner Soc•iet IJ/oc, 2~)
I :'J'i'l<:t~ Ni\Tt ON,\ I, .J OU llN,\L 0 F Ell UCi\TIONAL lh:Vt•:LOI'M t•:c•J'I' :)21 , :l21-:l:l() (2009 ): i\ra rat
Osipian, Corrupt Organizational Hierarchies in the J<IJT·mer .'louie! Uloc, I 7 TIL\:-\c;ITI0\1
STIJillt<:S Ht<:VII•:W. Sl'lll)\(:tm K22. KK2-K:J6 (2010).
11:). Text of ILK •11:)7 [llOthJ: Higlwr Education OpporLunitv /\ct. iWuiluhle at
h ttp://frwe hga t e. access. gpo. gov /cgihin/g't'tdoc.cgi'~dhnanw=l1 O_cong_hills&docid=f:h11 :l/ cnr. txt. pdf.
Tlw
Higher
l•;ducation i\ct (H ]•;;\) was reauthorized by the US Congn•ss on .Jul:-· :ll. 200K. The
Congn•ss passt•d the Higlwr Education Opportunity i\ct af'tt•r fourlt't•n extensions. five
years af'tc•r lfw dc•adlirw. This bill was signed into law by l'n:sident Bush in Augu,;t 11.
200K.

1 Hi. IICt•: llnolysis o/ lligher Hdu.cation Act H('(lu/horization. /\~11<:1<1('<\:-..1 CoU\1('11.
0:-..1 I<;IHI(';\TI0\1 1. 7 (/\ug. 200K), http://www.acend.. t'du//\M/'I\:mplatc•.cf'm''Section=
St ·arch&sl'ction=( iovernnwn t_l{e lations& t c:m pia Le=/CM/
ContPntDisplay.cfm&Contc•ntFilt> I D=fi71 :) ("DisclosurPs t.o borrowc:rs: l.endc•r·s of
private education loans must make certain disclosure's t.o horr<>WPrs in any application
(or any solicitation that dol:s not rPquin: an application), as Wldl as at tlw timl' of loan
approval and loan consummation. The disclosures must includt' information regarding
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Implications

There is a growing concern that higher education becomes
more of a commodity offered to consumers. In one article,
authors Tim Kaye, Robert D. Bickel and Tim Birtwistle point
out that "[t]here is widespread concern that higher education is
being compromised by being turned into a 'commodity' to be
'consumed."' 117 In their attempt to explore the trends in both
the U.K. and the U.S., and to consider how the law has
responded to them, they argue that:
There is an important distinction to be drawn between
'commodification' and 'consumerism'. Education has always
been a commodity to be bought and sold; the true danger lies
in the move to a 'rights-based' culture where students (and
politicians) see education merely as something to be
'consumed' rather than as an activity in which to participate.
Whilst the law seems thus far to have been something of a
bulwark against this movement, it remains an open question
as to whether this will continue to be the case if HEis do not
themselves act more proactively in challenging this damaging
view of higher education. 11 X

It would be fair to say that when the terms "commodity"
and "consumerism" are present, there should also be the term
"credit" as well. Consumers routinely use consumer credit to
acquire commodities ordinarily called consumer goods.
In the U.S., using credit is a norm. Widespread consumer
credit and the use of credit cards have taken place in American
society for decades. The average American carries a credit card
debt of several thousand dollars and considers it normal. 119
Buying a house through a mortgage with a thirty-year
repayment plan is also a norm. This is not the case in many
other nations, and some are just turning to the culture of
consumer credit. Others have had consumer credit on a limited

the terms the terms of the private loans as well as federal student financial aid.").
117. Tim Kaye, f{obl•rt D. Bickel & Tim Birtwistle, Criticizing the Image of the
Student as Consumer: l~xamining Legal Trends and Administrative Responses in the
U.S. and U.K., 18 EllUC. A:-.JIJ L. 85,85 (2006).
118. !d.
119. Credit
Card
JJebt
Statistics,
HOFFMAN,
BH.INKEil
&ROBER'I'S,
http:l/www.hoffmanbrinker.com/crcdit-canl-debt-statistics.html ("In 2010, the U.S.
census bureau is reporting that U.S. citizens have over $886 billion in credit card debt
and that flgurp is expected to rise to $1.177 trillion this year. Mon' specifically, tlw
report states that each card holder has an average credit card deht of $5,100 and this
number is projected to reach $6,500 by the end of this year.").
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scale for many years. Present consumption against future
earnings is considered to be risky and a not very rational
consumer behavior, especially in traditional societies.
Educational loans face challenges in societies accustomed to
consumer borrowing and those not accustomed to the culture of
consumer credit. In the U.S., people are ready to accept
educational loans as a part of their consumer credit culture
that anticipates borrowing against future earnings. Moreover.
as education is considered to be an investment good rather
than consumption good, this type of consumption may be
adopted even by the savvy and encouraged by the government.
However, there are other loans in addition to educational loans.
Lenders of educational loans will have to compete for
customers not only among themselves but with the lending
industry overalL They will try to attract customers and make
them borrow for education instead of borrowing for a car or a
house. Educational loans providers will thus clash with
providers of car loans, mortgages, and such.
Profit pressure is indeed the key when analyzing modern
trends in the U.S. higher education industry and the potential
for abuse. When the U.S. government was the sole, or the
dominating player in the education loans business, there was
no profit pressure on state bureaucrats and thus there might
be little fraud. When private for-profit educational loan
providers enter the market, their interests in combination with
the public sector makes fraud virtually unavoidable. Ideally,
students arc indifferent to whom they borrow from, the
government or private loan providers, as long as the terms and
conditions of borrowing are the same.
Private funding of public HEls is the basis for many
corruption-related problems. There is no profit pressure on
HEis, but there is profit pressure on the private lenders. The
incentive structure is such that student enrollment becomes
the result of profit pressure while consumer protection remains
a political activist agenda. One potential safeguard from
predatory lending in the higher education sector would be to
limit governmental regulations, educate consumers. and
encourage responsible consumption. In this three-sided
concept, each individual ought to be an educated consumer to
make right choices regarding the quality and quantity of
education services to consume. At the same time, each
individual has to make rational decisions regarding borrowing
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from the state and private educational lenders in order to be a
responsible customer of the loan industry. The rest is already
theorized and well developed m the econom1c 1ssue of
intertemporal choice. 120
One can argue about the extent of the consumerist
approach in higher education across the nations, but the trend
toward presenting the higher education sector as a provider of
educational services is obvious. 121 The market mechanisms
that are being introduced on an increased scale in higher
education do not free the industry from corruption, including
numerous forms of misconduct. In his book on the
commercialization of higher education, Derek Bok points out
that:
[t]he recent surge of commercial activity is best understood as
only the latest in a series of steps to acquire more resources,
beginning with the use of aggressive marketing to attract
tuition-paying students in the early twentieth century, and
moving on to the determined search for government and
foundation funding after World War II, and the increasingly
sophisticated and intensive effort over the last fifty years to
coax gifts from well-to-do alumni and other potential
donors. 122

The equilibrium of supply and demand, with consumers
voting with their dollars for the best possible choices, does not
necessarily lead to the elimination of public sector based

120. lntertemporal choice is the study of the relative value peopk assign to two or
more payoffs at different points in time. Most choices require decision-makers to tradeoff costs and benefits at diffenmt points in time. These decisions maybe about savings,
work d'fort, education, nutrition, exercise, health care and so forth. For nearly 80
years, economists have analyzl'd intertemporal decisions using the discounted utility
(DU) model, which assunws that people evaluate the pleasun's and pains n'sulting
from a dr>cision in much thr> same way that financial markets evaluate losses and
gains. exponentially 'discounting' the value of outcomes according to how delayed they
are in time. DU has been used to describe how people actually make intl,rtemporal
choices and it has heen used as a tool for public policy. Policy dl,cisions about how much
to spend on research and development, health and education all depend on the discount
rate used to analyze the decision. Gregory S. Berns, David Laibson, & George
Loewenstein, Int!'rt!'mporal choice--toward an inte!Jrative framework, 11 TJU:NIJS IN
C()(;NJTJVE
SCIENCES
182,
182-188
(2007),
available
at
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstn,am/handle/1/1551:J:l2/Laibson_lntertempont!Choicl'.pdf1
seqtwnce=2.
121. Tim Kaye>, Robert D. Bickc•l & Tim Birtwistle, Criticizing the Image of the
Student as Consumer: I~xaminin!J Le!Jal Trends and Administrative Responses in the
U.S. and U.K., 18 EDUC. AND L. 85, 85 (2006).
122. DEREK BOK, UNJVERSITII•:S IN THE MARK~:TI'LAC~:: THE COMMERC'IALIZATION
OF HIC:H 1-:J\ EDUCATION 10 (2001).
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corruption. Different forms of corruption exist in the private
sector as well. The legal definitions presented earlier explain
why the New York State Attorney General launched his
investigations under the auspices of consumer protection and
fraud rather than corruption and bribery.
The cases investigated by Attorney General Cuomo may
necessitate development of certain measures, tools, and even
institutions, such as the Consumer Education Fund established
by Cuomo himself, as well as changes in legislation, designed to
prevent doubtful practices in the futurc. 123 Provision of private
educational loans is a growing industry in the US. It rose
sharply from $1.57 billion in 1996 to $17 billion in 2006 and is
expected to grow continuously and rapidly in the future. 124
Similar developments may take place in other nations in the
future, as commercialization of higher education proceeds. The
process of transferring education financing to private
educational loans represents the major trend in higher
education funding and may soon be borrowed and adopted in
other countries. 125 Subsequently, changes in legislation and
regulations are necessary as are provisions in universities'
codes of conduct not only in the U.S., but also in many other
nations.
Some theoretical developments arc also possible. The core
of the problem of corruption is an intentional restriction of
students' access to reliable information about the available
educational
loans.
This
situation
implies
imperfect
information, imperfect competition between the educational

12:l. /\ndrt>w Cuomo. now the N<,w York Stat.r• govt>rnor, continu<•s his rdlor·t to
<•nham·t• consunwr· protr,ction: In the sl'ction Mt•rging and Consolidating Stat<' Agr•ncir•s
of his proposal r·ntitiPd "2011-12 Ext>cutive lludgr't l'rovid<•s Tr:msl'ormation l'lan for a
:'\l<·w Nl'w York." Cuomo suggt>sts that "Tiw Ext>cut.ive llud,t;et propos<'s to nwrge or·
consolidall' 11 s<•paratp Statl' l'ntitil's into four agr,nci<•s to stn•amlinl' and l'iiminat<•
duplicativl' bureaucracy. bdter align State rl'sponsibilitir•s with m•ed and impron•
servicr's through SUJWrior coordination. Proposals include nwrging tlw Banking and
lnsurancL' departments and the Consunwr Protection Board into a rww Dqmrtnwnt of'
Financial l{egulation." Gouernor Cuomo's 2011-12 lc'xecu tiue 13udget l'nll'ides
Trunsji;nnation !'fan jiJr a New New Yor/1, GOVERNOI(S l'ln:ss 01·'1·'1('1•:. Ft>h. 1. 2011.
http://www.governor.ny.gov/pn•ss/020111 Lransl'ormationplan.
121. '/'rends In Student Aid, COLLI•:<:~<: BO,\IW, 2007, http://www.collt>g<'hoard.<·om/
pmd downloads/about/m•ws_inf(Jitn•mls/tn•nds aid 07.pdf. See also CH,\HI.Io:NI·: W!•:.\1~
SII\1\10:--.JS. Ci\I.IH>I~NI;\ i{I•:SI•:AilCII illJilK\LI, STUI>I·:NT LOANS !·'Oil HH:III-:Ili•:!HiC\TIO:-.J ;;~)
(2001-l). uuallable at http://www.libr·ary.ca.gov/crb/OK/OK-002.pdf.
12fi. See. for instance, i\rarat Osipian, Comparing· Corruption in Hight>r l•:ducation
in the US and thl• !{]<' (Nov. 19. 2011) (unpublished paper pn,st>nted at the Annual
Conf('renn' o/ the Association /or the Studv o/ llighcr l~dumtlon (ASH/.;)).
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lenders, and a certain degree of monopolization of the market
of educational loans and eventually brings into fore antitrust
law.
The Cuomo cases in higher education are clearly not those
of subprime loans and predatory lending. However, this may
well be the case in the future, especially with a growing default
rate on educational loans, a significant part of which are
processed by the fast growing sector of for- profit higher
education. The Consumer Education Fund, established by
Attorney General Cuomo, is primarily focused on educating
constituents on predatory lending issues. 126 There is a legacy to
this issue as well. In 2000, then HUD Secretary Cuomo joined
forces with Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, former
President of Harvard University, to form the National
Predatory
Lending Task
Force. 127
Investigations
in
inappropriate lending patterns in higher education are not a
surprise but rather a natural development. The investigations
of misdeeds in educational loans touch upon broader financial
aid issues and then naturally develop into investigations of
possible abuses in study abroad programs. 12 X The
investigations may eventually address all the areas where

126. Press ]{elcase, Cuomo Announces Settlement with Student Loan Company
Tied to NCAA Division I Schools: Lender to f:nd Kichbachs and Co-HrandinR
Aweemcnts, STATE OF NEW YoltK OFFICE (JI<' THE AT'I'OKNEY Gi•:NEltAL, Dee. 11, 2007,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_c,~ntt~r/2007/dec/dec11 b_07.html.
See
also
Direct
Mar/cetinR Code of Conduct, STATE OF NEW YOitK OFFICE OF THE ATTOitNI•:Y GI•:NEitAL.
Dec. 2007. http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2007/dec/DeceptiveJ,oanCodeConductPoster.pdf.
127. "J{ecognizing that predatory lending was a multifaceted issue with substantial
consequences for many consumprs, as well as for the mortgage industry, HUD
Secn•tary Andn'w Cuomo joined forces with Treasury SL>cretary Lawrence Summers in
April 2000 to form the National Predatory Lending Task Force. The Task Force drew
its members from a wide range of inten,sted consumer. civil rights, and community
groups: mortgage lending industry trade associations representing mortgage lender;;,
brokers. and appraisers: State and local officials: and academics." Allen Fishbein &
Harold Bunce, Subprirne Marhet Growth and Predatory LendinR, HOUSJ:--.JG POLICY IN
THE
NI•:W
MILLENNIUM.
available
at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/
pdf/brd/1 :lFishbein.pdf.
128. "Months after he subpoenaed nearly a dozen private providers of overseas
programs about their business practices and financial arrangements with colleges,
New York State's attorney general, Andrew M. Cuomo. has expanded his investigation
to colkgP study-abroad offices themselves ... Mr. Cuomo's office has sent subpopnas
and doeument requests to 15 colleges, including American, Brown, Columbia,
Fordham, Harvard, Northwestern, and Pace Universities: Manhattanville College; and
Hobart and William Smith Colleges." Karin Fischer, Cuomo I~xpands InuestiRation of
Study-Abroad Prowarns to Collew~s, THE CHRONICLE OF HICHE!t EDUCATION, ,Jan. 21,
2008. http://chroniele.com/article/Cuomo-Expands-lnvestigation-of/120.
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consumer fraud in higher education has a potential to develop
or already takes place.
Even if predatory lending and consumer deception do not
fall under the corruption and bribery provisions, kickbacks do.
Kickbacks are bribes that are promised in advance and dearly
anticipate expectations on the side of the bribe giver. 129 At the
same time, they are paid post factum and present certain
guarantees to the donor. 130 As the educational loan industry
grows, so do the opportunities for abuse. Authorities can no
longer ignore this situation and what appears to be a long term
trend in the education industry. 131 Higher education loans
constitute an $85 billion per year industry, and the industry is
growing rapidly. 132 According to the New York State
Department of Education, two-thirds of all four-year college
graduates nationwide now have loan debt, compared with less
than one-third of graduates in 1998. 133 In New York State, 59%,
of undergraduates took out loans to finance their college
education. 134 The average student graduating from a four-year

~~~l. "Payoff is a pay of a certain shan: or a fix<•d sum to tlw pducator in authm·ity
who allocated funds t.o the payer of the bribe. Also S<'<: kickbacks." Ararat Osipian.
Glossorv of 1/igher l~ducution ('orruption with Kx:planations. THI·: Ellli('.\TI<l;\1
Rt·:c;oUiiCI·:S INI•'OIUvL\TION CJo:NTI-:Il. (ERIC). 20 (2009), auuiluhle at http://(•ric.<•(\.gov/
l' D I<'S/ E D:"iOfiO:-lH. pdf.
I :m. "Kickbacks an' hrib<>S paid post ante. State funds allocated to a Ill•: I ma,·
n•quin• a hrih<• for tlw stat<> official who mad<> tlw allocation d<·cision. Ghost t.eaclwrs
on the payroll can pay a rwn·cntage of their salary to tlw univ<•rsit:->' administmtor who
listPd tlwm on tlw payroll. Kickbacks an' not fix<•d at I 0 JWIT<•nt of tlw total contmct
valm· hut vary and may n•ach to 90 percent of th<> total valuP ... /d. at I 1-l.
1:31. l'n:ss ]{please. Attorney General Andrew Cuomo Announces First IA•gal Action
in College Loan Industry lnuestigation. ST:\TI·: <W Nt·:W YOI(K (h'l'l('lo: <H' THI·: i\'i"I'Oii;\II·:Y
Mar. :m.
~007,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/nwdia cpntpr/~007/mar/
G I•: '-I I•: HAL.
mnr~2b_07.html ("'EFI' nggTcssiv<dy of'f'en•d schools cash kickbacks in <'xch;mg<' f'or
busim:ss. · Cuomo said. 'This kickback schenw was widesprPad and took pia<:<: from
coast to coast. at. colleges large and small. public and private. This lawsuit is just. tlw
bt:ginning of an investigation that will show that. lenders put market share ahovL' fair
play. A pn•f'c:rr<:d lc:ndc:r ought to nwan that t.lw It,ndcr is prdPtn'd by stud<•nh f'or its
low rates, not. b:-• schools fur its kickbacks. With t.hL• cost of coll<•ge rising l'V<•ry day. tfw
last thing students want to hear is that their lc:nder may be muscling aside a mon•
competitiv<> loan package.'").
1:l2. CH:\I{LI·:NI·: WI•:;\ I( SifVIMO;\IS, CAt.ii"OHNI;\ ]{i·:c;I(\I(('H llLJI(I·:i\ll, STlllll•:'-1'1' LO.\\Ic;
FOil Hi<:lll<:l( EllUC:\TIOi\:. 1 (200:-l). uuailahle ut ht.tp://www.lihrary.ca.gov/crb!O:-l/OKOO~.pdf.

1 :l:l. l'n•ss i{<d<•ase. Attomcy General Andrew Cuomo Annou.nces First IA'.Wtl Action
in College /,oan Industry /nucstig-ution, STAT!•: <ll-' Ni<:W YOI(K (Ji.'I•'ICI·: 01-' THI•: /\TTOI(\II•:Y
:\1ar. :HJ,
2007.
http://www.ag.ny.gov/nwdia __ cc:nt<·r·/:2007/mar/
G I·:N !<:It\ I..
mar~2h

07.ht.ml.
1:l1. lr/.
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college in New York owes $17,594 on graduation day. 135
Lastly, the results of the investigations and intentions to
sue point to the practice of what one would define as "admitting
without admitting," when colleges and private providers of
educational loans de facto admit the wrongdoing or misconduct,
but are de jure regarded as not guilty. Both the HEis and the
providers of educational loans that are under investigation
agree to stop their doubtful practices, sign the Code of Conduct
offered by the Attorney General, 136 and even contribute to the
Consumer Education Fund set by the Attorney General. 137 This
"voluntary" contribution, made by for-profit enterprises, along
with the refusal to admit any wrongdoing prevents the
establishment of a true court-based legal precedent. At the
same time, such half-victories achieved through bargaining and
negotiations work as political dividends for Attorney General
Cuomo, who is an elected official. In a statement regarding the
settlement with Nelnet, Attorney General Cuomo Cuomo said
that "by paying for exclusive referrals of their loans, Nelnet
violated the trust that students and recent graduates place in
their schools and alumni associations." 13 X The situation
reminds one of an aggressive campaign of the state on free
enterprises with the demand for money, but even more so
seeking protection of consumer rights of the state's
constituents, including students and their parents. 139 One of

1:15. /d. See also lJcmocratic Members of the Senate Hold a News Teleconference on
the Release of the Student lJebt Jleport, POLITICAL TRANSCI{II'T WII\E, .June 28, 2006,
http://www.accl~ssmylibrary.com/article-1 G l-11758:J8:i:l/democratic-memhers-senatebold.html.
1:l6. IJirect Marketing Code of Conduct, supra note 126.
1:n. Kdly Field, Nelnet Settles With Cuomo by Agreeing to Cease /Jeals With
Alumni Groups, 'I'm; CHIWNICLE ()(<' HIGHER l~IJUCATJON, ,July :n, 2007,
b t t p ://chronicle .com/article/N e I nd- Settles-With- Cuomo- by/:l9:l1 :1.
1 :i8. /d.
1 :i9. "Nelnet, tbe nation's second-largest student-loan consolirlator, has agreed to
stop paying alumni associations to recommend its consolidation loans. Undc'r the term:;
of a sl'ttlement agn~ement with Attorney General Cuomo, Nclnet will cancel its
'affinity' agreements with 120 alumni associations and pay $2-million into a consumereducation fund established by Mr. Cuomo. Nelnet previously agreed to pay $1-million
as part of a settkment with the Nebraska attorney general, but that agreement did not
require~ the lender to end its referral arrangements ... According to Nelnet, the terms
of the afflnity agreements varied depending on whether the alumni association was
independent of or aff1liated with the university. Independent alumni associations
received payments for every loan consolidation they direded to the lender above a
certain thn~shold, while affiliated associations received an annual fee only. In return,
the alumni associations typically promoted tbe lender on their Web sites and allowed
Nelnut to use their college's logo for advertising purposes." ld.
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the settlements illustrates this point:
In recognition of the Attorney General's leadership m
improving the circumstances under which education financing
is made available to college students and consistent with
Sallie Mae's commitment to educating the public about the
financial aid process, Sallie Mae agrees to donate $2 million
to the New York Attorney General's national fund for
educating high school seniors and their parents regarding the
financial aid process. 140

Corinthian, lnc. demonstrated the similar defensive denialbased strategy when it came to a settlement with the state. 141
Oakland City University also denied any wrongdoing. 142 The
offensive campaign of the state is met with the traditional
defensiveness of HEis, in which the tradition of denial of any
wrongdoing is certainly at least as strong as their willingness
to revise and change current institutional policies.

V.

CONCLUSION

The
processes
of
decentralization,
marketisation,
commercialization, commoditization, and privatization m
high<~r
education
raise
questions
of
accountability,
transparency, quality, and access. Decentralized financing of
higher education anticipates cost-sharing based in part on
educational loans. The decentralized U.S. higher education

110. l'rcss i{Pit'ase, Attorney Ocncml Cuo111o Announces Settlement with Sallie Afue
iAJCtn l'ructices. S'i'XI'/<: <H' Ni•:W Yo!lK Oi<'J<'I('J·: OF '!'HI·: i\'l'TOII:-:EY
(; J•:NJ-:JC\L. Apr. 11. 2007, http://www.ag.ny.gov/nwdia ct•nt.t'r/2007/aprlapr11 a 07. html.
H 1. i\ndt·t•w Calvin. Corinthian to l'uy $6.5 Million. 0Hi\N<:E C<HJNTY I~I·:<:J,.;'I'J·:H.
1\ng. 1.
2007,
http:l/artides.ocrt'gister.com/2007 -0:-\-() 1/husinpss/
2170:-l~l:l2_1 __ corinthian -studPnts-corinLhian-collc•gps-sl>tt h>nwnt
("( 'ori nthian
J'<'S]l<Jlldt•d in a stai.Pment, 'W" disagn'l' with thP AttornPy (;l'lll'ral's conclusions. hut
w<• are pll>ased to havt· this matt.pr behind us. Tlw agrP<'nwnl is not r•vidl'lll'l' of
wrongdoing, and tlw company specitlcnlly dl'nit>d any wnmgdoing as part of tlw
sPtllenwnt. We an• full~· committed to providing quality Pducation and job plat·r•nwnt
snvicr•s f(Jr students and to being in compliance with stalt> law and regulation.'").
H~. K;Jtc• Bntsl'l', College Settles /,wi!Sliit, Oahland City Owes S:J.:J Million.
l•:v,\NSVII ,u: COlJIU 1m & 1'1n:ss. ,July :n. ~007. http://www.courit•rpn•ss.com/m,ws/
2007/jul/:ll/collt•gt•-sl'ltles-lawsuit/ ("Oakbnd City Uniwrsity n•sponded 111 a
stall•nwnt: 'Termination of t.h" lawsuit. sPttll'S a dispute concerning the propridv of <l
compcn,;ation pl11n for admissions counsl'lors that was in dft>ct wlwn the lawsuit was
initiatt•d and <'nable,; OCU. as wt>ll as thP other parties. to avoid tlw l'XJWns<'. lmnlr•n
and uncertainty of litigation and administrative procel>dings. Tlw Trustl'PS wish to
t:mphasizP that tlw sett.IPnwnt is not punitive and dot:s not implv that anv funds wen•
missing or urwccount.ed for, nor th:tt OCU fll'l'Sl>ntly lacks or has pn·viouslv i<tckt•d
financial n•spon,;ibility to participatl' fully in lfighpr J•:ducation Act pmgrams."').
01•cr its Student
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system that has long been considered an exception among other
developed nations now turns into a sector from which
inferences are to be drawn. This anticipates spillovers of
problems, but not solutions. Forms of corruption that have long
existed in the U.S. education sector, including those in quality
assurance through accreditation, compliance with state and
federal laws, and provision of educational loans, now have a
potential to develop in other educational systems as well.
The law and the legislative process in general are central
not only to the way the U.S. system is organized, but also to the
way it operates and resolves current problems. This fully
applies to U.S. higher education. If an individual or an
institution wants to resolve a certain problem, the solution may
be found primarily within the court system. The judge is to
decide, and the decision is to be made based on laws. The
majority of suits are settled out of court in order to avoid high
cost of a court trial, but the dispute is resolved between the two
arguing parties, while state bureaucrats have no much
involvement in the dispute resolution. National systems of
higher education in other developed and transition countries
can be characterized as centralized systems with states often
playing a dominating role in most of the issues. Accordingly,
the decisive power belongs to the executive branch, including
the Ministry of Education and other ministries that impose
numerous regulations and restrictions, impose sanctions, and
resolve current problems with the help of the army of state
bureaucrats structured in a strict hierarchical order. For
instance, rarely one will see legal disputes between students,
HEis, and the state in the Russian Federation being resolved
in the court of law. When problems emerge, they are being
routinely channeled to the bureaucratic hierarchy for the
decision or resolution and in most of the instances do not end
up in courts or even reach the point of some legal proceedings
or out of court settlements. If a HEI does not comply with
certain rules and provisions and students' or state interest are
compromised, the institution may well be placed on probation
or closed; and the leaders of this institution may be
reprimanded or replaced. The so-called administrative resource
plays a key role in decision making and dispute resolution.
Hence, while the problems faced by the U.S. higher education
industry and by national education industries in other
countries may be common, the solutions may be found in
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different areas. However, this situation may change if both the
higher education systems will become more U.S.-like and the
balance between the judiciary and executive powers of the state
will shift more toward the judiciary branch.
In the cases considered in this paper, the defendants did
not admit any wrongdoing while at the same time they agreed
to pay compensation. They did not regard such compensation
as punitive damages and pointed to unclear legal provisions
that regulate certain aspects of the higher education services
provision. The government stated that colleges and financial
institutions had committed several wrongdoings, but did not
rely on this explicitly tough approach and also avoided court
trials while opting for out-of-court settlements. By making this
choice in each particular case, the government admitted ipso
facto the existence of grey areas in the legislation. Although out
of court settlements are encouraged due to the expense and
time involved with going to trial, no precedent is set by the
court ruling simply because the cases are settled out of court.
Hence, both the government and the defendants point to the
grey areas or not-so-clear legal provisions in the legislation.
The application of the appropriate laws is also not very clear
when it comes to higher education, which explains the
existence of grey areas. This lack of clarity is explained in part
by the unclear nature of the product of higher education. The
pretrial out-of-court legal settlements prevent the creation of
the legal precedent that would be set if the decision were made
in a federal court. Applying a legal framework in research of
corruption in higher education allows us to avoid the discussion
of what is non-corrupt and what would be the ideal uniform
ethical standard in the higher education industry, universally
applied to different types of HEis and affiliated entities. But
the issue of non-corrupt practices and what constitutes a
higher education sector free of corruption remains and may be
addressed in future research.

